

Jens Ummethum

## **Actors' Perceptions in the Context of Conflict Resolution in Former Yugoslavia**

WP 2011-07

**Bielefeld University**



**St. Petersburg State University**



**Centre for German and  
European Studies (CGES)**



**CGES Working Papers** series includes publication of materials prepared within different activities of the Center for German and European Studies both in St. Petersburg and in Germany: The CGES supports educational programmes, research and scientific dialogues. In accordance with the CGES mission, the Working Papers are dedicated to the interdisciplinary studies of different aspects of German and European societies.

The paper is written on the basis of the MA Thesis defended in the MA SES in June 2011 supervised by Dr Nikita Lomagin. The publication of this MA thesis in the CGES Working Paper series was recommended by the Examination Committee as one of the five best papers out of fourteen MA theses defended by the students of the MA programme "Studies in European Societies" at St. Petersburg State University in June 2011.

**Jens Ummethum** graduated from the University of Osnabrück (Germany) and Malmö University (Sweden) before joining the MA SES programme in Saint Petersburg.

**Contact:** [jens.ummethum@gmx.net](mailto:jens.ummethum@gmx.net)

### ***Abstract***

Using the conflict in former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War as a focal point, this paper examines actors' perceptions in the context of conflict resolution. The focus is on the European Union (EU) and its most influential member states; France, the UK and Germany. Employing analytical methods, the accompanying process of the development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU is examined. Particular attention is devoted to the building of identities. An extensive theoretical framework containing theories of International Relations and European Integration (constructivism, neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism) as well as a study of the EU as an organization provided the basis for explanations of the observed phenomena.

The EU as an umbrella has changed national actors' perceptions in the sense that a certain "Europeanization" can be detected due to the constant interaction which has changed the culture. Several dynamics were identified that led to the EU's evolution in the area of foreign policy and decision-making. Among these are public pressure, the realization that the EU's tools were inadequate for conflict situations; the search for more independence from the US and NATO and security for Europe; and enlargement and cooperation as a means to reduce spending.

**Key words:** European Union, Yugoslavia, Identity, France, UK, Germany, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Constructivism, Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism



## **Abbreviations**

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
G-20	Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
HR	High Representative
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IR	International Relations
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WWII	World War Two (1939-1945)



<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1 THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA .....	10
2.2 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU .....	13
<b>3. THE EU AS AN ORGANIZATION .....</b>	<b>15</b>
3.1 A META-ORGANIZATION .....	15
3.2 ROLES AND FUNCTIONS .....	18
<b>4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>5. MAIN ACTORS AMONG EU MEMBER STATES.....</b>	<b>26</b>
5.1 FRANCE .....	26
5.2 UNITED KINGDOM .....	32
5.3 GERMANY .....	38
<b>6. THE EU AS AN ACTOR.....</b>	<b>44</b>
6.1 IDENTITY, PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES.....	44
6.2 EVOLUTION OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES .....	48
6.3 US, NATO AND RUSSIA.....	52
<b>7. CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF THE CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>APPENDIX II: TIMELINE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.....</b>	<b>67</b>

# 1. Introduction

## *Originality of the Topic*

The end of the Cold War brought many changes to Europe and the world. With the breakup of the Soviet Union bipolarity ceased to exist and the US became the only remaining superpower. Countries and organizations were forced to re-define their roles and adjust their policies. The EU<sup>1</sup> was at that time regarded as a “civilian power” which fit its self-perception (Duchene in Sjursen 1998: 98).

The conflict in Yugoslavia took place right in Europe, at the borders of the EU. This was a new experience for the European Community and forced it to act. The Treaty of Maastricht<sup>2</sup> contained a pillar for a CFSP which was designed to enable the EU to speak with one voice<sup>3</sup>. It took until 1995 to stop the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina but the CFSP remained a work in progress and reforms were included in the Treaties of Amsterdam in 1994 and Lisbon in 2009<sup>4</sup>. Even with a peace agreement in Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia still experienced unrest and fighting which culminated in the 1999 Kosovo war. Today there is a new political map in the Balkans but many problems remain unsolved, for example the status of Kosovo. Is it independent or still a part of Serbia? A former Yugoslav republic, Slovenia, is now a member of the EU while Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro are candidates for membership. Serbia has submitted an application.

In this paper I analyze the perceptions of the main actors among the EU member states as well as the Community itself. The states chosen are France, Germany and the UK. This is mainly because France and the UK are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which gives them a certain political influence. Germany is included because of the influential role it plays after becoming the

---

<sup>1</sup> The EU was established under its current name “European Union” in 1993. Before that, the Union was usually referred to as the European Community (EC). To facilitate reading, “EU” is used throughout.

<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Maastricht was signed in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. Its official name is “Treaty on European Union” (TEU). It is also sometimes termed “Maastricht Treaty”.

<sup>3</sup> See a detailed timeline of the European Integration in the appendix

<sup>4</sup> Signed in October 1997, came into force in May 1999

<sup>5</sup> Signed in December 2007, came into force in December 2009

largest EU member state. The underlying motivation of this dissertation was to investigate the involvement of the EU in the conflict in Yugoslavia. However, it soon became obvious that this aim is closely connected to the sphere of a common policy in foreign and security affairs. Furthermore, not only the EU was an actor in the conflict but also several member states themselves and other actors such as NATO, the US and Russia. Being aware of this context, the aim of this dissertation is not only to examine the EU as an actor. In addition, the focus will be to identify the factors and dynamics leading to the observable changes in the foundation of the EU with regards to a CFSP. Therefore, the key research questions are:

1. Has the EU as an umbrella changed national actors' perceptions?
2. Which dynamics led to the evolution of the EU from Maastricht to Lisbon, especially with regard to the decision-making process and foreign policy?

This thesis does not only hope to make a modest contribution to the analysis of a CFSP but also aims at providing an outlook of the future development of the EU in the aforementioned policy areas. The Lisbon Treaty has only recently been ratified. By providing an in-depth investigation of the whole process leading up to this latest treaty, including a close look at the question of identities and perceptions, it will be possible to draw valuable conclusions which will be helpful for future work in this field of research.

The field of European integration and related areas has been covered extensively over the recent years and decades. Renowned scholars include among others Helene Sjursen, John Peterson, Christopher Hill, Reinhardt Rummel and Lisbeth Aggestam. Aggestam connected identities with foreign policy interests which provided a useful insight. Neofunctionalism, which had been declared irrelevant in the 1970s and 1980s, is helped to a rebirth by Stuart Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet who bring up new supporting articles for its continued relevance in a recent article. Liberal intergovernmentalism which opposes the neofunctionalists, was created by Andrew Moravcsik. Constructivism offers a kind of different perspective on international relations

than older theories. It has been employed more and more by scholars over the recent years. One of the main inventors of this approach is Alexander Wendt.

### ***Structure***

This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 comprises the introduction and chapter 7 the conclusion. In chapter 2 a historical background of the conflict in Yugoslavia is presented which facilitates the understanding of the whole analysis. Chapter 3 consists of a theoretical part. First of all, the fact that the EU is an organization will be scrutinized in an attempt to get better insights as to how such an organization works. Organizational Sociology offers a theoretical approach. Nils Brunsson and Göran Ahrne's concept of a meta-organization is presented and certain characteristics are identified. Chapter 3 analyzes the EU in order to highlight these characteristics and elaborates on their consequences. This will be essential in order to be able to make conclusions on how the EU really works and how changes can be identified. In addition, the roles and functions of an organization will be sketched out and elaborated on.

Chapter 4 analyzes IR-theories and theories of European integration and examines their explanatory strength regarding the research questions. The main characteristics of the theories will be outlined for this purpose. It is necessary to employ several theories because of the nature of research, which deals with the EU as an actor but also member states and their behavior in the international arena. Moreover the development of European integration will be examined as well. No theory alone is able to explain certain behavior by states.

Chapters 5 and 6 make up the main part of this dissertation. The actors are analyzed regarding their perceptions in the context of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the accompanying evolution of the EU, which is evident in the treaties signed during this period of time. Chapter 6 is devoted to the EU as whole and its actions and perceptions as well as its development. Chapter 5 consists of an analysis of the three main actors within the Union: France, Germany and the UK. Each of the chapters follows a similar structure in order to make comparisons easier and ensure the validity of conclusions. Apart from the concluding part in

each chapter, which presents the answers to the research questions, an analytical and argumentative part is included which enables us to draw conclusions.

Lastly, the concluding chapter not only presents the findings of the analytical part, which will be summarized from all other sections, but also contains a reflection on the methods and material which were used in this paper. Furthermore, potential open questions for further research in this area will be presented. Finally, an outlook for the future of the EU's development in the field of common foreign and security policy is given, which is based on the findings of this dissertation and aims at assisting future studies of this topic.

### ***Methodology***

Concerning the methodological approach, this dissertation is analytical. To a lesser degree it is also comparative, argumentative and narrative. In addition to the field of foreign policy, which has to be covered when it comes to the conflict in Yugoslavia, the identities and perceptions of EU member states and the evolution of the EU itself are analyzed. Roy Ginsberg (2001: 22) states that “the foreign policy system requires an understanding of the interplay between national actors (influenced by subnational, regional, and international stimuli) and European actors and “Europeanized” institutional norms and practices”. Concepts helpful in explaining the processes by which input is converted into output include multilevel diplomacy, liberal intergovernmentalism, two-tier bargaining, constructivism, and Europeanization (Ginsberg 2001: 22).

The material used for this dissertation consists of a broad range of sources. Primary and secondary literature was critically worked with in order to gain information on the development of a CFSP, the main actors and their involvement in the process, the conflict in former Yugoslavia and liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as well as constructivism in the field of theories of European integration and International Relations. With regard to identities and perceptions, which are especially crucial for constructivism, Eurobarometer offered a good base of studies and surveys which provided a

useful source. In addition, accounts by politicians who were actively involved in the topics covered by this dissertation have been considered as well because they offer good insight into perceptions. These primary sources contain speeches and memoirs. Some sources are still classified and, therefore, not available to the public. That is why Strobe Talbott's, Richard Holbrooke's or Hubert Védrine's writings are important because they offer the views of people who were involved in the events. Newspaper articles and official documents have also been used for the analysis. Secondary sources, while not offering the same validity as primary sources, are obviously necessary as well, especially when it comes to the theoretical part, but also in order to make up for a lack of primary sources in some cases.

Finally, comparative analysis was applied as well. This allows the detection of differences among the main actors regarding perceptions of the EU, of themselves, and of foreign and security policy. The concept of identity is crucial in order to be able to get valid results. It is essential for the development of the research questions, which form the basis of this dissertation.

## 2. Historical Background

### 2.1 The Conflict in Former Yugoslavia

This chapter aims at providing a short background to the history of the conflict in Yugoslavia. This is necessary in order to better comprehend the events that accompanied the breakup of the country and the politics and perceptions of all involved parties<sup>6</sup>.

The whole war has to be seen in the context of the changes in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and even before. The communist Yugoslavia was the leader of the non-aligned countries in the bipolar world and held together under Tito to preserve its status although it consisted of several republics with different interests and ethnicities (Nye 2005: 154). The country could be described as the most liberal of the communist countries and, consequently, developed differently from most of these states. In the 1950s and 1960s it received a lot of help from outside because it was regarded as a possible buffer to a Soviet invasion. In the 1970s, help from the Western countries was declined and Yugoslavia experienced serious economic growth problems. Another reason for this was the oil crisis, which hampered exports to the West as these countries faced economic problems too. Kaldor points out the importance of these historical circumstances for the unraveling of the state of Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s because nationalist arguments could be used as a way to cope with economic discontent among the population and especially among those who suffered the most from the crisis (Kaldor 2001: 37f.).

In the summer of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia. In Croatia, ethnic Serbs and Croats started fighting. The reaction of the UN was to impose an arms embargo on all members of the former Yugoslavia (Nye 2005: 154). Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically diverse of the former Yugoslav republics. Muslims made up the majority of the population but there was a sizable Serbian and Croatian minority as well.

---

<sup>6</sup> A detailed timeline of the conflict in former Yugoslavia can be found in the appendix.

Yugoslavism was especially strong in Bosnia with many people identifying themselves with Yugoslavia instead of their ethnicity. The Yugoslav National Army, which had been an entity of the united country, disintegrated at the beginning of the 1990s due to underfunding and the split-up of the country and became a “combination of regular and irregular forces augmented by criminals, volunteers and foreign mercenaries competing for control over the former Yugoslavia’s military assets (Kaldor 2001: 44f.). Bosnian Serbs set up autonomous areas on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, after the Muslim government of the republic declared independence from Yugoslavia, they proceeded to declare their own independent Serbian Republic. War started in the spring of 1992. Western countries recognized the independent Bosnia while Serb-led Yugoslavia was expelled by the UN (Nye 2005: 156).

The President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, can both be regarded as the leaders of the new form of nationalism which emerged in Yugoslavia. While Milosevic used the new forms of electronic media to propagate his nationalist message, Tudjman developed the horizontal transnational form of organization, mobilizing the Croatian diaspora in North America in support of his party in Croatia (Kaldor 2001: 39f.). Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the most mixed society of the former Yugoslav republics, bore the brunt of this new form of nationalism as the biggest war was fought on its territory. On the other hand one must point out that Yugoslavism was especially strong in Bosnia; however, the nationalist parties got most of the votes in the elections. This is due to the fact that no voter was used to having a free choice and if there was any doubt, the easiest way was to vote for the party which represented your own ethnicity (Kaldor 2001: 41f.).

The traditional explanations of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina regard it as an ethnic conflict, a view that led to a total misunderstanding of the war. In the case of identity formation it follows primordialism, which considers group membership as a given thing. Mary Kaldor’s explanation builds on the social constructivism, which regards identity as being manufactured rather than given (Jeong 2000: 71f.). The international community legitimized the nationalist perception of the

conflict by seeing nationalism as a given in the conflict. It misses the point that the Serbian and Croat leaders used the idea of ethnicity and nationalism to establish total control over the population like the communist party did before the breakdown of Yugoslavia. In order to reach that goal, regions had to be “ethnically clean” so that they could be better controlled.

The new kind of warfare which included “fear and hatred” fits in this context. A warring party tries to control the population by expelling those that could be dangerous to its interests. This is often called “ethnic cleansing” and includes various means of getting rid of people that are not welcome, mostly other ethnicities. The brutality of these means led to a high number of civilian casualties and displaced persons in the Bosnian war. Kaldor states that this “fear and hatred” was not endemic in Bosnia before the war but it was mobilized for political purposes, which in effect meant producing ethnically clean regions (Kaldor 2001: 8; 42). Typical for the war in Bosnia and other new wars is the existence of paramilitary groups that make up a large portion of the troops in the war. They often consist of gangsters who use the war for private aggrandizement. The influence of other countries is very significant, especially in Bosnia, where the neighbor countries exerted a lot of influence by providing weapons, money and paramilitary groups, which were often organized so that regular forces could be held back. Most members of the paramilitary groups were not nationalists fighting for their ethnicity but criminals or redundant soldiers in search of a better income. As the economy broke down, the fighting units in Bosnia became heavily dependent on assistance from the outside. Checkpoints where convoys of the UN or other humanitarian organizations had to pay or in other cases were just looted were also very common (Kaldor 2001: 93). In 1995 the treaty of Dayton fixed the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines, which means that the nationalists reached their goal with the help of the international community. Kaldor underlines that there could have been other solutions because nationalism was manufactured and not endemic (Kaldor 2001: 58).

In 1989/1990 the Serb president Slobodan Milosevic revised the autonomous status of Kosovo (Miall/Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999: 121). Since then the Albanian Muslims, who made up 90 per cent of the population in that area, have had to live under Serb police rule. While peaceful at the beginning, the conflict turned into a more aggressive one in the mid 1990s due to the actions of the widely supported Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It answered the Serbian oppression with terrorist attacks (Miall/Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999: 124). Serbia started an intensive military intervention and was, therefore, able to drive the KLA away from many areas it had gained before. This ended in an enormous displacement of 240 000 Albanian civilians by the end of September 1998 and a military intervention by NATO in 1999 after the achieved peace treaty had been broken by the Serbs (Miall/Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999: 124).

## **2.2 Foreign Policy of the EU**

The EPC was the first step taken in 1970 but it only included the goals of regular consultation, coordination of positions and, if possible or desired, common action (Smith 2004: 8). Those were aims that did not give much power to the EU-institutions but left it in the hands of the member states. The members did not want to give away this important field of politics. When the conflict in Yugoslavia began, the EPC was still valid; it was not replaced until 1993. After the end of the Cold War, the Maastricht Treaty aimed at preparing the EU for new challenges. This included a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three pillars of the new union. Member states were asked to bring their positions in line with the CFSP common positions. Moreover, the European Commission was now allowed to submit proposals for the CFSP, which was previously not possible under the EPC. A re-structuring of Commission Directorate-Generals was supposed to help to fulfill the new task and establish it as a new and more powerful member of the European Council (Smith 2004: 9f.). The Maastricht Treaty and the new CFSP were designed to help the Union and its member states act in a conflict such as the one in the Balkans, but it failed in this capacity. Neither the members nor the Commission were able to put forward a useful



response in time and the result was that the EU became marginalized while NATO took over (Peterson 1998: 8ff.). This experience led to changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was a revision of the Maastricht Treaty and entered into force in 1999. It strengthened the CFSP by establishing a new office, the CFSP's High Representative, whose task was to coordinate the EU's common policy and to be a contact person for non-EU states (Peterson/Sjursen 1998: 174ff.).

The last step was the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in 2009. It merged the High Representative and the Commissioner of External Relations to create the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is the main coordinator and representative of the CFSP within the EU (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009).

### **3. The EU as an Organization**

#### **3.1 A Meta-Organization**

At this point it is essential to take a closer look at the EU as an organization. Organizational sociology provides a useful insight into this sphere and helps us to understand how organizations work. Organizations are commonly conceived of as having individuals as members but in many cases such a conception does not cover all organizational types, as there is a growing amount of organizations that have other organizations as members. This type of organization is called a meta-organization. The EU is an example of this type because its members are nation-states and are, therefore, defined as organizations.

When dealing with meta-organizations it is important to point out a few unique characteristics of this kind of organization. The EU is an association of states. This implies that every state has become a member voluntarily and can theoretically leave the association at any time (Ahrne/Brunsson 2005: 430). The aims of the EU are the prevention of war and the reinforcement of democracy as laid out by Robert Schuman in his declaration, in which he asserted that Europe should be united so that a war such as WWII could never happen again (Schuman 1950). These aims were widened over the course of the following decades and nowadays the EU consists of a common market among other things. States joining the association therefore have to come to a consensus regarding these aims. It has to be kept in mind that the EU and its predecessors were created by organizations themselves, namely Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. More states decided to join at later stages.

Brunsson/Ahrne (2005: 433ff) name different motives that might apply to states attempting to join a meta-organization. The two main goals have been mentioned above, that is the desire to achieve peace and democracy. These two could be categorized as values according to the motives presented by the authors. Another valuable goal is the achievement of external influence by co-operation.

After the Second World War only two superpowers emerged, the United States and the Soviet Union. European states were devastated from the war and were themselves too small to exert much influence. For them, working together seemed like a viable option for remaining relevant in the arena of world politics. The costs of membership in the EU are very small as Brunsson/Ahrne (2005: 434) point out. I believe that in the aftermath of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the EU realized that only cooperation and speaking with one voice would really help its cause because otherwise the US-led NATO would dominate the agenda. (Smith 2004: 11) Smaller countries might find this aspect of an association especially attractive because otherwise they would have trouble being noticed at all.

The issue of who can become a member of the EU has often been raised. As its name implies, members should be European countries. Turkey is a candidate country which is controversially discussed because only a small part of the country is on the European continent, with the majority being located in Asia. The feature of a “cultural Europe” which is characterized by Christianity enters the discussion as well. Brunsson/Ahrne (2005: 437) underline the fact that the “nature and efficacy of the EU is affected by its members”. In my view, it took the EU a considerable amount of time to become a commodity in the field of politics and especially in international affairs because the shadows of some of its members loom large. This might have been a factor when the crisis in Yugoslavia started. The member states and the EU itself were not sure about their respective roles as it was the first of such conflicts on European soil. The EPC in effect at that time was clearly unable to handle the situation and the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam tried to establish new guidelines in order to enable the EU and its members to have instruments to deal with such a conflict (Peterson/Sjursen 1998: 170ff).

How is the decision-making in a meta-organization affected by the fact that there is more differentiation among its member organizations than there is among individuals, as Brunsson/Ahrne (2005: 440) highlight? The EU consists of all kinds of countries, ranging from very small to very large, each with its own

history, structures, administrations, etc. This will lead to different interests and differences in available power or influence. Leadership is also a crucial point. Every state has its own leader who might have more power and a higher status as the leader of the meta-organization. This might be a source of conflict in the EU, where influential leaders have their own agendas (Ahrne/Brunsson 2005: 440). In my opinion another factor that comes into play is whether elections are coming up in one of the member states. This might lead to a change in politics of this respective country's leadership and may become another source of a potential conflict as well as making this country more unpredictable.

As the previous paragraph has shown there is ample room for conflict inside a meta-organization such as the EU. Bargaining and voting are just two of the measures practiced in order to come to solutions. However, these are no easy ways of dealing with the problem. Ahrne/Brunsson (2005: 441f.) underscore this point and come to the conclusion that meta-organizations restrict the areas where they take on responsibility. The EU uses the principle of subsidiarity. The case of foreign policy is a tricky one. Even though the association gradually enlarges its responsibilities in this area, foreign policy decisions still remain largely in the hands of the member states. Newer developments that were introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon might change this but it is too early to tell at the moment. Some important questions to be considered are the potential increase in homogeneity among the EU members (which means that they would cover all the same fields of activity), and whether the existence of one of them could be called into question. In the case of the EU, this would result in the founding of a new state (Ahrne/Brunsson 2005: 445). Against this assumption stands the fact that the EU was not able to have a constitution ratified because some member states' populations strongly opposed this idea (BBC 2007).

To sum up, the EU as a meta-organization shows some of the typical characteristics identified by Ahrne/Brunsson (2005). Identity of membership, competition among the members as well as between the association and its members, and conflicts over responsibility are just some aspects that have to be

taken into consideration when analyzing the EU, especially regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

### **3.2 Roles and Functions**

Having already looked at the EU as a specific type of organization - a meta-organization - it seems viable to address certain roles and functions of an international organization. Clive Archer offers a comprehensive analysis of this topic. "The role of international organizations is that of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends" (Archer 2001: 68). Decision-making is a crucial factor. The possibilities include unanimous or majority voting. This does not imply that every decision made over time has to serve each and every member. Rather, this must be considered over a period time to see whether the instrument fulfils its purpose (Archer 2001: 72f.). Looking at the EU, member states use it as an instrument to reduce transaction costs, for example, by means of the single market. Even if not all decisions are favorable to members in the long run, they profit. Foreign policy can be an issue as well. Strong member states might want to use the EU in order to gain more influence on the world stage and strengthen their own arguments. Smaller member states have the chance to build coalitions that would potentially be able to isolate a large member state.

A second role of international organizations is that of an arena or a forum, where members meet, discuss, argue, co-operate or disagree. The arena itself is neutral but its role can be seen reflected in the working of its institutions (Archer 2001: 73; 77). Coming back to the last paragraph, the EU as a forum gives opportunities to all member states to bring forward their own opinions and try to persuade others. Heads of states meet regularly as well as the permanent representatives.

Thirdly, international organizations are independent actors in the international system. The institutional framework determines the extent to which they can act independently. Strong institutions allow for decision-making unaffected by members. Just the mere presence of international organizations changes the



international system (Archer 2001: 79ff.). An example is the involvement of the EU as a whole in conflict situations or the presence of the President of the European Commission at G-20 summits. Enlargement can be seen as a strategy to gain even more influence. Not only for the institutions but also for member states who aim at a larger union and bigger markets.

Socialization is an important function of international organizations. In a nation-state, agencies carry this process out with the aim of instilling in the individual person loyalty to the system in which he or she is living as well as acceptance of the main culture and institutions (Archer 2001: 99). The EU is presented as an international organization with strong instruments of socialization due to its many institutions such as the Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice, etc. A “community spirit” can be developed among the citizens and interest groups that deal with the EU which does not necessarily have to be in competition with the loyalty to national institutions (Archer 2001: 99). Socialization does not only take place inside an organization but it also has an effect on potential member states. The way in which these states adjust their political systems in order to be able to become members of the EU underlines the influence that socialization carries.

Concerning rule-making, the EU has supranational bodies such as the Court of Justice and to a certain extent the Commission. The Council of Ministers is still the most powerful body with regards to rule-setting (Archer 2001: 104). Rule-application is performed by EU member states with the Commission making sure of application. Problems arise when a member state’s policy runs counter to EU policy (Archer 2001: 105). Member states who worry about their sovereignty in the EU will try to promote intergovernmental institutions in order to have a greater degree of influence on decisions and to be able to use a veto.

#### **4. Theoretical Framework: Theories of European Integration and International Relations**

In order to answer my research questions, there is a need to bring international relations and EU integration theories into the frame. A thorough examination of the EU and its member states necessitates the employment of several theories. First of all I deal with the behavior of actors in the international system, namely the EU and France, as well as the UK and Germany. Secondly I analyze developments within the EU as an independent entity. Having established these areas of interest, I decide on three theories that will provide the assistance and ability to answer my research questions and explain the results of my findings in the aforementioned subjects. Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are two well-known theories of European Integration. The former is much older, having been established by Ernst Haas in the early stages of the EC. The latter was developed by Andrew Moravcsik in 1993. It was partly designed to counter neo-functionalism and to provide a more suitable alternative to explain the continuing process of European integration. Sandholtz and Sweet provide their own version of neo-functionalism which draws on Haas's ideas but offers some new aspects. In this section I will discuss the partly contradictory view of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as well as provide my own findings in regards to my research questions.

Neo-functionalism illustrates the process of regional integration by introducing three causal factors and their interaction with each other: (1) growing economic interdependence between nations, (2) organizational capacity to resolve disputes and build international legal regimes, and (3) supranational market rules that replace national regulatory regimes (Haas in Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 7). The creation of supranational authorities is the key for further integration since it leads to changes in the expectations and behavior of social actors. These actors shift their focus to the supranational level. The newly-founded transnational associations and other interest groups try to exert influence and offer policy solutions on this level. Neofunctionalism speaks of "positive feedbacks" that

sometimes even lead to new cycles of feedbacks called “spillovers”, which occur when actors realize that supranational aims can only be reached by transferring more competencies to that level (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 7f.).

The American political scientist Ernst Haas developed the theory in the process of early European integration. However, at the beginning of the 1980s neofunctionalism was more or less abandoned because the events of the 1960s and 1970s proved the initial scholarly expectations of continuous integration of the EU to be unsubstantiated (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 2f.). Haas himself was of the opinion that his theory was obsolete at the time. Globalization and the growing of post-industrial problems in the richer Western countries made it necessary to deal with these developments at the global level rather than at the regional level such as Europe (Haas 1975, in: Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 4). Sandholtz and Sweet (2010) further investigate this topic and provide their own analysis which proves the continued relevance of neo-functionalism among theories of European Integration.

They argue that the Commission and the ECJ are two influential bodies advancing European integration and its supranational character. This is due to the fact that over time they have made decisions which ran contrary to the member states’ interests. Under the treaties of the EU these two institutions are entitled to this kind of power and will continue to act accordingly (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 12ff.). Institutionalization is an essential characteristic of neo-functionalism. It is a term for “the proposition that shifts toward supranational governance and tends to propel the system forward” and helps to explain why there has been and continues to be “a high degree of stickiness” in the development of supranational governance in the EU (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 15f.). This is due to the fact that integration has to be understood as a dynamic process. European actors continuously discover the limits of the existing rules, resulting in rule changes that open up new areas as well as new forms of interaction. This process starts anew when the actors adapt to the changes. Therefore institutionalization has a “cyclical character” and the body of

supranational rules grows in the EU but its exact shape would be impossible to predict (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 16).

Sandholtz and Sweet argue against another common theory of European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism. They point out that the EU will always possess certain intergovernmental elements because decisions are the outcome of bargaining among member states, for example in the Council of Ministers. All federal systems have intergovernmental processes and the authors point to the importance of distinguishing “between intergovernmentalism as a mode of governance and intergovernmentalism as a theory of [...] integration” (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 30f.). According to these authors, Moravcsik makes his theory non-falsifiable because even when EU-governments do not follow member states’ preferences, the outcome can be explained by his theory. This lessens its distinctiveness, relative to neofunctionalism. The same goes for the fact that Moravcsik does not acknowledge the existence of important transnational actors yet economic interdependence is a mainstay of his theory, as it is in neo-functionalism (Sandholtz/Sweet 2010: 32f.).

Andrew Moravcsik developed liberal intergovernmentalism in 1993, which means that it is much younger than neofunctionalism and was obviously faced with a different economic and political landscape. It was designed in response to the demise and the shortcomings of neofunctionalism, which at that time was deemed obsolete by many scholars including Haas himself, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter. Moravcsik himself offers a detailed explanation as to why neofunctionalism is not capable of providing explanations for the process of European integration. In his view the predicted spillover-effects in the political sphere had not taken place. An automatically deepened integration and greater supranational influence from the Community could not be observed (Moravcsik 1993: 475f.). The author is even more critical of the theoretical buildup of neo-functionalism. Over the years it became too focused on the case of the EC while constantly being adjusted, so that in the end no clear structure was left and everything could somehow be explained. However, the predictions about the variations in the evolution of the Community were not being fulfilled due to a

lacking foundation in essential general theories of domestic and international political economy (Moravcsik 1993: 476f.). In Moravcsik's eyes this theoretical foundation is absolutely necessary because predictions cannot be made without theories that deal with self-interested actors and their strategies to build coalitions and alliances as well as the solving of conflicts among them. Neofunctionalism lacks this essential characteristic as evidenced by its analyses of international bargaining where it does not give explanations of how governments choose among several options (Moravcsik 1993: 477). "Neofunctionalism remains today an inductively derived ideal-type rather than a general theory [...], a pre-theory of regional integration" (Moravcsik 1993: 478).

Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism has "three essential elements: the assumption of rational state behavior, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation" (Moravcsik 1993: 480). By employing this theory in analyzing major decisions in EC/EU-history a two stage-approach is used. Firstly, national preferences are heavily influenced by economic interdependence and its restrictions and possibilities. Secondly, the relative bargaining power of governments and the rewards of a functional institutionalization, generated by high transaction costs combined with a craving to control the agenda in domestic policy, are the deciding factors in the outcome of negotiations between governments (Moravcsik 1993: 517).

Schimmelfennig (2005: 92) concludes on liberal intergovernmentalism that is a theory which can be in dialogue with other theories of integration because it is itself a mixture as has been highlighted earlier. Among the possible "partners" are intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists. Different areas of analysis of EU politics bring up certain possibilities to combine liberal intergovernmentalism with other prevalent theories.

The preceding analysis of the existing theories in the field of integration is essential in order to explain developments in the EU/EC. Nevertheless, as the scope of my research is broader, these theories do not provide adequate

answers to my research questions. My topic concerns foreign policy as well as international relations, so it is necessary to consider theory from these fields which will be helpful in gaining a better understanding of the underlying processes. The American scholar, Alexander Wendt, is one of the main academics who has established constructivism in the field of international relations. In 1992 he published “Anarchy is What States Make of it”, laying the foundation for the school of social constructivism, which challenged neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. He further expanded his thoughts with the 1999 book “Social Theory of International Relations”.

Two main principles of constructivism have been widely accepted by students of international politics: “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1999: 1). According to Wendt (1999:1), the first principle is an “idealist” approach to social life, opposing the “materialist” view, while the second is a “holist” or “structuralist” approach that emphasizes the growing powers of social structures and opposes the “individualist” standpoint which regards social structures as reducible to individuals. Therefore, Wendt coined the term “structural individualism” for his constructivism.

As was pointed out earlier, constructivism attacks the two other main schools of thought in the field of international relations. It seeks answers to the question of how things become what they are. Norms that influence politicians change over time and constructivism examines the processes that lead to altered preferences, and the shaping of identities or new behaviors among political leaders, peoples and cultures (Nye 2005: 7). A key term in this context is identity. Every person has a set of different identities that are tied to his or her institutional roles; furthermore, each identity constitutes a natural social definition of the actor. This is a crucial fact because “identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992: 398). Constructivism offers a way to better understand how changing identities and interests are able to alter states’ policies in the international arena. It sometimes lacks predictive power but it allows us to gain an enhanced perspective of the

areas that are missing in other main theories of international relations (Nye 2005:8).

The aim of this chapter was to establish a theoretical framework that would enable me to work with my research questions. First of all it was necessary to understand the process of European integration. I chose to take a closer look at neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, two main theories in this field. The latter was developed as a follow-up to the “failed” neofunctionalism by Andrew Moravcsik at the beginning of the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. However, Sandholtz and Sweet (2010) offer a detailed analysis which stresses their argument that liberal intergovernmentalism is not a real theory and that neofunctionalism is still the leading theory in the field of European integration. In my view the two theories can complement each other because their strengths lie in different areas.

The last part of the chapter examined constructivism as a theory of international relations that will help with explaining events in the field of international and foreign policies that are connected to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. I believe it is a very good alternative to the long-dominating schools of realism and liberalism which fail to deal with crucial questions such as the building and changing of identities and the consequences of the making of policies by states and other international actors.

## 5. Main Actors among EU Member States

### 5.1 France

France's foreign policy was shaped by presidents Francois Mitterand from 1981 to 1995, by Jacques Chirac from 1995 to 2007 and since then by Nicolas Sarkozy. It is essential to not only cover the years of the actual conflict in former Yugoslavia but also the decade leading up to it because this is where the foundations were laid for future developments.

France had accepted the EPC and the accompanying innovations which aimed at the harmonization of member states' foreign policies. However, at the beginning of the 1980s France did not show interest in any political union with a common foreign and security policy and rather preferred a strengthening of the WEU with regard to security questions (de La Serre 1996: 21f.). This can be understood as a kind of mixed position: France was for an integrated Europe but also wanted to keep a large degree of independence from European decision-making and clearly favored intergovernmental decision at this point. Several factors led to a change in the French attitude towards the EC. On the one hand, France took over the Presidency of the Community in 1984 which led to the initiation of "a great European project" by President Mitterand. On the other hand, many European partners began agreeing with French skepticism towards American politics; a development that brought France closer its fellow EC-members (de La Serre 1996: 25).

A close friendship between President Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl developed in the 1980s. France had clearly chosen the European option and had strengthened its commitment to the Community because it regarded this option as the best way of tightly binding Germany to the West. Furthermore, the French President aimed at using a further integrated and stronger Europe to promote French interests in the world. Therefore the country wanted to take active part in the re-shaping and strengthening of the Community (de La Serre 1996: 25f.).

France, a country with a rich past as a world power, had been leapfrogged by the US and the USSR. However, it was still a permanent member of the UN Security Council and wanted to stay relevant on the world stage. The strategy of the French government was to gain influence in international organizations. The Council of Ministers of the EC was an especially important target because there were no Americans present and France enjoyed a great deal of influence. A strong European political voice was supposed to accompany and strengthen its national voice (Blunden 2000: 19). The end of the Cold War was another crucial aspect, especially for France. Not only did Germany become re-united, but the French lost their strategic position far away from the border of the Warsaw-pact countries which had previously given it room for maneuvering because of a lack of immediate danger of invasion in the case of war (Blunden 2000: 20). To sum up, France had had a comfortable position during the years leading up to the end of the Cold War. The EPC often enabled France to disguise its own national interests as European ones while also keeping its own ambitions on the international arena. Moreover, the principle of consensus allowed the country to continue its independence in important areas such as defense where it was not militarily integrated into NATO (de La Serre 1996: 29).

France tried to promote the OSCE as the lead organization responsible for collective security in Eurasia because it did not want to see a deepened American influence via NATO. However, this plan failed because NATO proved to be the only Western organization capable of military intervention in former Yugoslavia. This was a serious blow, which created a threat of marginalization because, as has been pointed out earlier, French influence in NATO was small (Blunden 2000: 20) France was forced to find new strategies to deal with this challenge as well as with a re-unified Germany. The Treaty of the European Union offered a new opportunity for French politicians. European integration was to be deepened and a CFSP included in order to keep Germany fully integrated and controllable (de La Serre 1996: 32). In addition, France aimed at a potentially upgraded EC/EU, which was supposed to help French interests and become a counterbalance to NATO.

At this point it seems appropriate to put the focus on French identity which plays an important role in the policy of its leaders. France always aimed at protecting French culture and the French language. The continuation and acceleration of globalization and the rise of American culture and English as the dominating world language seriously threatened this target (Blunden 2000: 21f.). Promoting cultural diversity worldwide was also seen as a means to protect French culture. France regarded itself as a “mission country” carrying a “universal message” based on its “cultural exceptionalism” and French language; this view was shared by politicians and the public (Cohen in Blunden 2000: 22). With this aim France was once again in competition with the US but under different conditions: the US on the rise, France on the descent (Blunden 2000: 22). A way out of this dilemma was the political assertion of the European Union “as an extender or amplifier of French power” which would not force France to abandon sovereignty (Védrine 1996: 293). This was the standpoint most French politicians agreed with because it also enabled France to stay independent from the US and to strengthen its own security as well as French values. France would help to develop a European idea that contained a large part of French ideas and would also assist the country to use the clean reputation of the EU to make up for its own sometimes dark colonial past in a number of developing countries (Blunden 2000: 22f.).

With regard to the CFSP that was discussed in the Treaty of Maastricht, de La Serre (1996: 33f.) recognizes the ambivalence of the French position. On the one hand, a common CFSP was desired; on the other hand, it was supposed to be closer to the existing EPC with a strong intergovernmental design. In addition, France still tried to promote the WEU as a focal point of European security policy in order to reduce NATO influence in Europe. France’s two-level game in which the EU was supposed to complement French interests ran into trouble when Yugoslavia started falling apart. France aimed at bringing all EC member states on board with regards to its proposal of handling the recognition of former Yugoslav republics. The French leaders did not want to encourage a quick break-up of Yugoslavia due to the fear that it might de-stabilize Europe because the USSR could be tempted to follow this example (Bodenstein 2002: 90ff.)

However, even after coming to an agreement with EC members that laid out strict rules for the independence of the Yugoslav republics, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia which rendered the agreement useless and forced France to comply. This incident showed France the power of the new Germany and the need to deepen European integration in order to contain its neighbors. The French recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, therefore, was supposed to show European unity even though France feared an escalation of the crisis in Yugoslavia (Bodenstein 2002: 96f.). Other factors weighed into the decision as well. Public opinion in France, opposition parties and even Mitterrand's Socialist Party all blamed the Bosnian Serbs for atrocities. The President felt that he needed to act and support the breakaway republics. In addition he attempted to convince the French public to favor a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty with Yugoslavia as the main argument for a CFSP (Macleod 1997: 246f.).

French politicians in power usually shared the view regarding the complementarity of a strong France and a strong Europe regardless of party affiliation, but this was not the case among other French politicians. Blunden (2000: 24) employs the term "Euroallergie" to describe the sentiments of politicians from the whole political spectrum who did not see French and European interests as compatible because the EU had led to a "decline in French status and prestige", as a former French diplomat put it (Perol in Blunden 2000: 24). While there was broad agreement in France that the country was threatened by the American way of life and a liberal capitalism of American shape, Alain Juppé, a member of the government, recognized the danger for the EU to not be able to decide or to act because of many people inside or outside of the Union preferring strong nation-states (Juppé 1995: 247). The conflict in Yugoslavia underlined these problems for the EU when it was unable to agree on important issues.

France under President Mitterrand usually had a good relationship with Germany in part due to a close friendship with the German chancellor and shared ideas about a strong EU. This changed under President Chirac who wanted to strengthen ties with the UK which led to a cooling-off with Germany. In addition,

Chirac was also not as enthusiastic as his predecessor about Europe (Blunden 2000: 25). The government continued to preserve French identity and when the escalating costs for defense industry development threatened to eliminate not only French independence in this area but also European independence, Chirac and the British government jointly started an initiative for a new European defense policy. Even though this re-affirmed the French strategy towards a strong Europe, the French public showed less enthusiasm for Europe than its leaders; it was more concerned with national or regional issues even though French politics always regarded Europe as a means to make France strong (Blunden 2000: 24f.). Steven Philip Kramer (2006) identifies President Jacques Chirac as the primary reason for the crisis in France that alienated the French from the EU and which culminated in the rejection of the Constitution for Europe by French voters. Chirac failed to resolve the economic and social crisis at home while simultaneously watching French influence in the EU disappear. Contributing to this is a lack of reform of policies in the socioeconomic area in France, a dwindling Franco-German relationship and a stagnant policy towards the EU even though the circumstances changed dramatically due to enlargement (Kramer 2006: 133ff.).

France has always had the aim to keep its rank at the international level. While this does not necessarily imply unilateralism on behalf of the French, it means that they want to be treated the same as the major powers, especially when French security interests are affected (Macleod 1997: 254). The White Book on defense from 1994 states that France “must contribute actively, undoubtedly more than others, to keeping peace in the world and to ensuring respect for international law” (Livre blanc sur la défense in Macleod 1997: 254)

The war in Yugoslavia forged better ties with Britain because French and British soldiers had worked closely together during war operations which led to heightened respect for each other even among politicians from both countries (Blunden 2000: 27).

Nicolas Sarkozy who was elected as French President in 2007 changed the foreign policy. He desires a better integration of France into NATO and aims at “transforming [...] relations with NATO” (Sarkozy 2008). Moreover, the President regards the US as a valuable ally of Europe: “We need NATO and a European Defence. We need the United States and the United States needs strong allies” (Sarkozy 2008). This is certainly a new development. Sarkozy is of the opinion that France can be more influential as a full member of NATO and as an ally of the US. The President has recently underlined French ambitions. French involvement in the Ivory Coast can be explained by a long-standing presence in the country and a history as a former French colony. Libya does not have this history nor is it francophone. France has taken on a leading role in fighting the Libyan dictator. The reasons for this could be the fear of loss of influence in North Africa, possible negative publicity if the Libyan rebels had been massacred, and the opportunity for “France to display its sense of responsibility as a permanent Security Council member and to live up to its self-image as a standard-bearer of universal values” (Financial Times 2011). Sarkozy clearly regards France as a great power and wants to show this to the world. It can be argued that such a game of power, influence and interests must be explained by neo-realism. However, it seems that a constructivist approach is more appropriate. French identity calls for involvement in these situations because their self-perception views France as having to fight for and spread its values. This is even more valid for former colonies where France regards itself as still bearing responsibility for their well-being.

This section deals with the attitudes, perceptions and identities of French people. In 1999 respondents of a Eurobarometer survey were asked about their attachment to Europe. 53% of them stated that they feel very or fairly attached to Europe, while 44% felt not very or not at all attached. This result put the French below the average of the EU. 56% of Europeans felt very or fairly attached and 40% not or not at all attached (European Commission 2001: 10). Whereas the answers to the question of attachment to Europe put France in fourth place from bottom among EU members, it ranked considerably higher when it comes to the

question of a European identity. 59% of French people feel to some extent European. 39% feel only French. The averages for the EU are 52% and 45% (European Commission 2001: 11).

Regarding a common foreign policy of the EU, 69% of the French support this suggestion while 20% are against it. France is roughly in line with the result in the whole EU where 67% are in favor of a common foreign policy and 19% oppose this idea (Eurobarometer 2003). Respondents were also asked whether they support a common security and defense policy. A large majority of French people is in favor of such a policy – 77% for and only 14% against. The results for the whole EU are 74% and 15% respectively (Eurobarometer 2003). Support for a common foreign policy has fallen to 56% in France in 2010 which is also lower than the average of 62% (Eurobarometer 2010: 225).

French citizens feel that the European model with foundations built on cultural and humanistic values is unique. Americans are perceived as different because their culture is regarded as being in opposition to European culture. French people tend to distrust America because of this (Debomy 2001: 5). The perception of the EU in France brought the result that the people support the ideal of a process of European integration that heads in the direction of a united Europe. This perception is shared by Germany. Furthermore, the closer alignment of EU countries in all areas is regarded as favorable by the French because it would establish the EU as a counterweight to the US (Debomy 2001: 7).

## **5.2 United Kingdom**

Over the course of time in question the UK had four prime ministers. Margaret Thatcher and John Major led Conservative governments before Tony Blair took over as prime minister representing the Labour Party in 1997. After he stepped down in 2007, his party colleague, Gordon Brown, replaced him in office until 2010, when the Conservatives won the elections. Britain is not a founding member of the EC like France and Germany. It joined the Community in 1973 along with Denmark and the Republic of Ireland. This chapter aims at identifying

the cornerstones and perceptions of British policy connected to the EC/EU and a common foreign and security policy using the conflict in Yugoslavia as an example.

Christopher Hill points out that, traditionally, Britain has always been adamant about having the final say in the matters of its foreign policy. This position was formed by the idea that parliamentary democracy is essential to national sovereignty, which implies a strong influence of the House of Commons, the British parliament. Moreover, the country has historically been skeptical of changes in the European makeup because there had been no gains from it (Hill 1996: 70). Therefore, the UK commonly prefers intergovernmental solutions in the area of foreign policy at EC/EU-level. The country has always supported informal developments with a focus on the practical side because it took the British parliament out of the equation as compared to official treaty amendments (Forster 2000: 45f.). It is advantageous for the government when it could act without involving the parliament. In this case the Community is used to strengthening the executive branch at the expense of the legislative.

Already in the 1980s Prime Minister Thatcher utilized the EPC in order to take advantage of a strong, coordinated European position when Britain needed it. However, this led to the further acceptance and establishment of a common European position and the path to a CFSP was cleared. The British government aimed at fighting for intergovernmental methods to be employed because its national foreign policy would be kept in place (Hill 1996: 76f.). Forster (2000: 46) comes to a similar conclusion. The UK did not want to deepen European integration in foreign policy and consequently argued for an intergovernmental solution which implied a strengthening of the Council of Ministers. Prime Minister John Major summarized his government's ambitions in the process of negotiating the Maastricht Treaty. He was aware that national interests are essential to the British people. In order to be able to make sure that these interests were incorporated into the Treaty, it was necessary to work with the Community. According to the Prime Minister, areas such as defense and foreign policy should always be in the national governments' hands and therefore

intergovernmentalism was the only choice (Major 1991). This strategy proved successful when the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty both fulfilled British aims in this area. Several reasons can be found for the UK's position. On the one hand, there is a close relationship with the US and a preference for NATO in certain questions, on the other hand the domestic audience in Britain has been rather skeptical of giving up competences to Brussels. This knowledge led British politicians to argue for intergovernmentalism and an informal increase of foreign policy coordination while trying to hide the progressing integration (Forster 2000: 47).

During the Amsterdam Council of 1997, which discussed a reform of the Maastricht Treaty, the UK led a group of countries which argued that the experience in Yugoslavia showed that the EU was not capable of formulating a CFSP. The British were not against a strengthening of the common policy but in their view it was just not possible within the setup of the EU (Kjeldsen 2007: 71). For them a radical change would imply giving up too much national sovereignty, which was out of the question at the time because of the factors pointed out earlier. In 1998 Tony Blair and his Labour government were in office. They gave up their fight for political independence of the WEU, which had been a pillar of British foreign policy for a long time (Sjursen 2003: 1). Britain teamed up with France for the Franco-British Declaration at St. Malo, in which it agreed to a strengthening of the EU's security and defense policy. This declaration was described as being of "constructive ambiguity" because both countries managed to put in their aims: France wanted to establish stronger EU capacities and structures while Britain underlined the importance of European capabilities within NATO (Kupferschmidt 2007: 4). What are the reasons for this change of mind? First of all, Tony Blair observed the ongoing debate about a stronger CFSP and saw the opportunity to gain a more influential role for his country by shaping this common policy. Abstaining from it would have meant being marginalized in the EU. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the result of the deliberations would be fully consistent with the role of NATO, always an important factor for the UK (Blair 2002).

Tony Blair's time as Prime Minister brought many changes in the British government's attitude towards the EU. The example mentioned above clearly shows this. In addition, he argued that Britain had missed many opportunities to become more involved in the process of European integration. "We are part of Europe. It affects us directly and deeply. Therefore we should exercise leadership in order to change Europe in the direction we want" (Blair 2001).

At this point it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the British ideas of the role of NATO and of British relationship with the US because it has been and still is a crucial factor as the analysis so far has clearly shown. NATO and the EU are two mainstays for security in Europe according to Britain's point of view. The two organizations should work together worldwide to fulfill the British aim of being a "force for good" in the world, a target which can be found in the European vocabulary as well (Kupferschmidt 2007: 5).

A recent development concerns British-French relations. On November 2, 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Defense and Security Cooperation Treaty, which is designed to build a long-term partnership. This covers, among other mutual projects in the defense industry, joint military facilities, cooperation in the area of nuclear installations and combined exercises and operation between the two countries' armed forces, including a Combined Joint Expedition Force, which will be available for bilateral, NATO, UN, EU or other operations (Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty 2010). Britain and France want to strengthen their bilateral defense coordination because they regard this as a means of supporting their obligations to NATO and the EU. Moreover, the two countries believe that the aims of certain treaties, for example the CFSP, could be reached more efficiently by this cooperation (Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty 2010). Britain has developed a history of cooperating with France especially on issues regarding security and defense policy as evidenced by the Franco-British Declaration at St. Malo in 1998 which was presented above.

The Lisbon Treaty coincided with the Premiership of Gordon Brown. Being aware of public opinion that was strongly in favor of national sovereignty, Brown emphasized the intergovernmental character of the Treaty regarding common foreign and security policies and pointed to “safeguards we have negotiated to protect British national interest” in addition to stressing that no future changes could be made against wishes of the British Parliament (Brown 2007).

Having analyzed the perceptions of Britain and France, it seems to me that they continue to see themselves as European countries that need to do more in the international arena. While taking part in the CFSP and using the advantages of the EU in international affairs, they continue upholding personal aims. The two former colonial powers want to stay relevant in the world and this cooperation highlights this fact. This joint agreement can be viewed as a sign to the world that Britain and France will continue to be influential in world politics in the foreseeable future. They will keep and increase military capabilities by cooperating, which will lower prices for weapons, for example. It also shows that even after the Treaty of Lisbon, the two countries will keep their options open away from the CFSP of the EU, a signal that they are not totally convinced that it will work, or alternatively, that they are not sure that their own national policies will be represented.

The attitudes expressed by the public in Britain should be scrutinized as well because they will surely have an influence on politicians’ decisions, especially, since the conflict in Yugoslavia was widely covered in the media. Eurobarometer 54.1 offers detailed information on people’s views. For example, in the year 2000 only 22% of survey respondents in the UK, the lowest number among all EU member states, were of the opinion that decisions concerning defense policy should be made on the European level (Manigart 2001: 12). Another survey in 2003 confirmed earlier results for the UK, which still had the lowest support in the EU for common foreign, security and defense policies. 37% were in favor of having a common foreign policy and 47% supported a common security and defense policy (Eurobarometer 2003). There were not many changes in 2010. 36% of the British population agreed to a common foreign policy which is the

lowest of any EU member state. The EU average was 62% (Eurobarometer 2010: 224). Such findings might be connected to a strong sense of national identity among Britons and, therefore, a lower sense of being European, resulting in less support for common causes in crucial policy areas that concern the traditional tasks of a nation-state. Additionally, only a rather small number of British respondents answered that they feel very or fairly attached to Europe (37%) while 57% stated that they feel not very and not at all attached to Europe (European Commission 2001: 10f.). Looking at national identities, the trend becomes clear. Only 30% of British people feel to some extent European, while 67% consider themselves as only having a national identity. These results put the UK at the bottom of the 15 EU-members when it comes to a European identity (European Commission 2001: 11). Support for EU membership is very low as well. 29% are of the opinion that it was a good thing while 24% regard it as bad (European Commission 2001: 21). There is apparently a strong skeptical feeling towards the EU in general among the population. Britons believe in the superiority of their own model of society and do not like to be considered European in this case and hesitate to consider Europe as a strong community (Debomy 2001: 5).

The data referred to in the preceding paragraph leads to the conclusion that British interests predominantly lie in the promotion of intergovernmentalism and the preservation of national sovereignty in key areas. The UK is embedded in many foreign policy networks outside of the CFSP and has always maintained a special relationship with the US. While the British government has a large number of responsibilities and freedom to act, government backbenchers are always a danger to the Prime Minister if his policies are regarded as threatening the support of the majority party among the population (Forster 2000: 53ff.). Britain has tried to bring its two main partners together in the hopes of creating a stronger EU-US relationship. These attempts, however, are met with criticism not only from French and German, but also from the British poll respondents. The government has taken on the complicated task to push for an EU with a global reach and certain common policies while also keeping up its special relationship

with the US (as became evident during the Iraq War where the British stood by its ally) and NATO (Kupferschmidt 2007: 5f.). This does not mean that the UK has always supported the Americans. In 1992, it sided with the EU in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia even though the US was opposed to it. The British government did not want to risk the common front with Germany because this might have weakened a united Germany's commitment towards an integrated Europe (Craddock, in Forster 2000: 55). This is a sign that Britain aimed at keeping a reunited and strong Germany thoroughly contained within a European framework.

### **5.3 Germany**

Germany was in a unique position at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. It had been a divided country since the end of WWII and shared a border with Warsaw Pact countries which, in the case of war, put it in a precarious spot. After the end of the Cold War and re-unification in 1990, Germany was now in the center of Europe and the largest member state of the EC/EU.

As a result of WWII, West Germany had only a limited capacity to conduct foreign policy because it was still under allied control and hosted many foreign troops in case of war. The EPC was therefore used by the government to widen its scope and ensure a thorough connection to its West European allies (Rummel 1996: 41f.). The unity of Europe has always been of utmost importance to the German government as it is the only way to secure freedom and democracy. Member states of the EC have to be closer and there is a need for more cooperation in the sphere of a foreign and security policy (Kohl 1983).

The re-unified Germany, which had regained full sovereignty, aimed at a deeper integration of the EC because it held the belief that only this would ensure a lasting peace in Europe. Therefore the government wanted to include the target of a European political union, which would include strengthened cooperation in foreign and security policy (Aggestam 2000: 67). As Germany was securely connected to the West after unification, it started to look east where it was now the neighbor of several former Communist states. In the eyes of the German

government these states should have become EC/EU-members to guarantee freedom and peace within these countries as well as within Europe. A CFSP was regarded as an instrument that could be used to achieve the desired Eastern enlargement (Rummel 1996: 46). An expansion of the EU eastward meant “that Germany would be in the middle of a safe, prosperous, integrated and democratic Europe rather than on its edge”, however, it seemed necessary to the Germans that NATO led the way by expanding first (Talbot 2002: 227).

Germany’s policy has been marked by the relationship with two main allies: the US and France. Even by proposing reforms for the area of European integration, the government always kept an eye on transatlantic interests. It had no wish to estrange NATO and the US from Europe (Aggestam 2000: 74). France was of equal or greater importance to Germany. The special relationship between the two countries was formed to overcome the violent history between the two nations and in doing so, ensure peace for Europe. After reunification, the Germans needed the French to be able to continue the integration process of the Community as their actions together had often been regarded as setting the pace and agenda for all member states (Rummel 1996: 47f.).

Even though the German identity was still influenced by the guilt and embarrassment of its Nazi past, in the 1990s a different side became more and more obvious in statements from German politicians regarding foreign policy. They wanted to show that their country had learnt from the past and were eager to promote European unity. Moreover, Germans showed pride in their democratic and constitutional achievements. Among German politicians, the federal character of the constitution was seen as a desirable development of the EU (Aggestam 2000: 67). Traditionally, Germany was more focused on its influence as an economic giant and the aim of its foreign policy was to safeguard trade. Politically, the influence of the country seemed limited, a fact which changed after reunification when the room for maneuver increased (Rummel 1996: 47).

A sign of a new and stronger Germany emerged in 1991 when the crisis in Yugoslavia began. Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent and

Yugoslav troops invaded Croatia. Public opinion in Germany was strongly in favor of independence for the two countries. The government of the newly-united Germany followed these demands from its population and strongly argued for the recognition of the states by the EU. France and the UK were opposed to quick recognition but the Germans did not give up their positions. The French and British then gave in to secure a common EU-position and for the sake of the new CFSP, which had just been included in the Maastricht Treaty (Grant 1996: 10). The unilateralist approach to the question of recognition was later regretted by German politicians. Germany wanted to be a reliable partner, and multilateralism was a priority. The conduct in the recognition of the Balkan republics was later described as “an aberration and failure of German foreign policy – a mistake not to be repeated again” (Aggestam 2000: 72). The new role of Germany, the perception of its new tasks and a feeling of responsibility might have been a factor in the Germans’ behavior. The aforementioned public opinion certainly put a lot of pressure on the government which gave in to it. The decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia quickly had grave consequences because it left the EU few options when Bosnia-Herzegovina also wanted its independence. The conflict between Serbs, Muslims and Croats in the country escalated into war (Grant 1996: 10f.). Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1991 emphasized the fact that Germany would support the wishes for freedom and independence of various European people because they should not be forced to stay within a country that suppresses them. Kohl pointed out that Germany understood its new role and responsibility and would act accordingly (Kohl 1991). The actions of the German government in the conflict of Yugoslavia have to be seen in this context.

The majority of Germans were in favor of increased European competences in the field of foreign and defense politics (Eurobarometer 1993: 26). The German government worked to improve the Union’s abilities in these areas of politics and wanted itself to become more active as well. Nevertheless, German troops were not deployed for multilateral missions in Iraq or Bosnia due to the belief among German politicians that it would be against German Basic Law. A 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that UN mandated combat missions are

in accordance with the Basic Law which gave the German foreign and security policy more opportunities and allowed it to become a full partner in Europe (Rummel 1996: 53). The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference offered a chance for Germany to bring a CFSP further into Community competences as a pre-condition for a political union, which was to be achieved later. The German position was marked by the idealism apparent in several supranational proposals to reform the EU and abolish the existing pillar structure. Over the course of the negotiations, the Germans had to realize that such a position would not be able to succeed; hence their strategy became more pragmatic. “Flexible integration” was a key term that was a reaction to a “Euro-realism” among European governments at the time which described a step-by-step approach to European integration in the field of foreign policy (Aggestam 2000: 73ff.).

In 2003 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder reiterated the desire of the German government to actively pursue upgrades of the CFSP. In his view Europe needed more capability to act in the world. In order to reach this aim, unity had to be achieved because only together would Europe be influential. Important to the German government was the inclusion of NATO in a concept of security in Europe (Bundesregierung 2003). Chancellor Merkel confirmed this view of NATO in 2007. In addition she pointed out that the EU could only enforce their interests in the world if it had more competences in the field of common security and defense policies. The advantage of the EU was the possibility to combine civilian and military means, according to Merkel. Moreover, the EU knows its responsibility for the Balkans and will continue to work to bring stability to the region (Merkel 2007).

A closer look at public attitudes towards EU-politics has been included earlier in this chapter. That discussion covered the beginning of the 1990s. In 2000, Eurobarometer conducted another survey on the subject. 43% of Europeans were in favor of having decisions concerning European defense policy made at the EU-level, 17% favored NATO and 24% thought that national governments should be responsible for decision-making in this area. The Germans were a bit lower than the EU-average with 38% agreeing to have this competence at the

EU-level (Manigart 2001: 11f.). In this survey the respondents had several alternatives to choose from. A 2003 Eurobarometer study aimed at identifying the level of support for a CFSP among European citizens. 67% of respondents supported a common foreign policy among member states, while 19% opposed it. The result is even clearer regarding a common security and defense policy: 74% were in favor of it, 15% against it (Eurobarometer 2003). The results in Germany show that respondents favored a common foreign policy amongst EU member states by a wide margin (77% to 13%). The same can be stated in the case of a common security and defense policy (81% to 10%) (Eurobarometer 2003). Germany is one of the countries with the largest support for the policies in question. In France the level of support is a bit lower but still above the EU-average while the respondents in the UK offered the lowest support of any member state (Eurobarometer 2003). Figures from spring 2010 confirm the trend. 72% of Germans are in favor of a common foreign policy which is much higher than the EU average of 62% (Eurobarometer 2010: 225)

Germans were also found to support a process towards a united Europe with closer cooperation in all areas which can be described as being in line with the original aim of European integration: to secure peace in Europe. The attitude was similar in France on this point but the French pointed out that a strong Europe is necessary as a counterweight to the US. Germans, who had traditionally been a close ally of the US, also started to notice many differences of opinion with the Americans. Moreover respondents in Germany held strong prejudices against overly bureaucratic EU-institutions (Debomy 2001: 7f.).

A look at the self-perception of people in Germany sheds further light on the country's attitudes towards and views on the EU. 58% felt very or fairly attached to Europe, while 37% stated that they felt not very or not at all attached to Europe. The results are a bit higher than the average for the fifteen member states at that time and show a stronger attachment towards Europe in Germany than in France or Britain (European Commission 2001: 10). National identity was not overly strong in Germany. 48% identified themselves as only having a German national identity and 49% of respondents answered that they had at

least a partly European identity. This put Germany in the middle pack of EU members. In comparison, the UK had a much stronger feeling of national identity, while on the other hand a majority of French felt at least partly European (European Commission 2001: 11).

The analysis of Germany, one of the main actors on the European political arena, has brought several results that can help to explain the country's attitudes and actions not only in the context of the conflict in Yugoslavia but also in the more general framework of a CFSP. It has become obvious that Germany had to learn to act in a new role after re-unification because the situation in both the country and the world had changed dramatically. A few characteristics stand out: Germany valued the continued enlargement and further integration of the EU as helpful to its own interests. Special relationships existed with the US and France - such an arrangement had not always been easy to achieve. On the one hand, Germany aimed at building a strong CFSP to be able to handle things without NATO; on the other hand, it did not want the US to be alienated from Europe (Aggestam 2000: 78f.). Generally, Germans were in favor of a CFSP, but a skeptical view of EU institutions and a perceived lack of benefits for Germany from membership in the Union complicated things for the German government (European Commission 2001: 23; 28).

The conflict in Yugoslavia was the first test for new "Germany". The early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, in part due to public pressure, was later deemed a mistake because traditionally German foreign policy had strongly favored a multilateral approach. Kosovo proved to be yet another challenge. Germany's original aims of using peaceful measures were challenged by widespread public sentiment demanding that the government take decisive steps in order to prevent abuses of human rights. Its own historical experience with the Holocaust was often cited as a reason (Aggestam 2000: 78ff.).

## **6. The EU as an Actor**

This chapter deals with the EU as a main actor. The focus is on the EU and its institutions which play a major role in the process of political decision-making. The Council of Ministers consists of representatives of the member states, while the European Commission and the European Parliament are independent. Another part of this chapter focuses on the identity and perceptions of Europeans, which is a crucial element in explaining policy changes at the European level. Finally, the scope is widened to examine the influence of other important actors such as the US, NATO and Russia.

### **6.1 Identity, Perceptions and Attitudes**

First of all it is important to take a closer look at the national identities of Europeans. How are they formed? Is there a collective European identity or do national identities dominate? These are questions that will be dealt with in this section. As pointed out in chapter 4, constructivism is one of the tools employed in order to explain certain developments. Shared ideas and identities are key concepts of this theory and directly influence decisions.

A study published in 2001 by the European Commission entitled “How Europeans see themselves” offers insight into the questions above. 56% of EU citizens felt very or fairly attached to Europe compared to 40% who felt not very and not at all attached. Especially strong was the feeling of attachment in Luxemburg, Denmark and Sweden, while people in the UK, Greece and the Netherlands were the least likely to feel attached (European Commission 2001: 10). Respondents were also asked questions regarding a European or national identity. 4% felt European only, 6% identified with European and their own nationality and 42% felt a strong affiliation with their own nationality and a European nationality. People who identified only with their own nationality comprised 45% of respondents. This means that there was a slight majority consisting of people who at least partly identified themselves as Europeans. Luxemburg, Italy and Spain were the states with the biggest majority, while

national identity was strongest in the UK, Finland and Sweden (European Commission 2001: 11). Another question in the study concerned a cultural identity which is shared by all Europeans. 39% completely and slightly agreed that there is such a shared identity, whereas 48% slightly and completely disagreed with that statement (European Commission 2001: 12).

Public support for membership in the EU should be interesting as well because it might have an influence on politicians. The decade following the end of the Cold War had the lowest figures of support for membership. Support fell from 72% in 1991 to 46% in the spring of 1997. Several reasons are given for this development: The Gulf War, the economic crisis, the debate on the Maastricht Treaty, the war in Yugoslavia, the addition of three rather eurosceptic countries (Sweden, Finland and Austria) to the Union and the BSE crisis<sup>7</sup>. However, by autumn 1999 support for membership had risen back to 51% (European Commission 2001: 20). That year the highest support was found in Ireland (82%), Luxemburg (81%) and the Netherlands (71%), while EU membership had the lowest support in the UK (29%), Sweden (37%) and Austria (42%) (European Commission 2001: 21). Respondents were also asked to give their opinions on joint EU decision-making in several key policy areas. Foreign policy was the second most supported issue with 69% in favor of joint decision-making at the EU-level. Defense policy received the support of 48%, while 46% preferred to keep the competences in this area at the national levels (European Commission 2001: 30). A large majority (89%) of Europeans regarded the maintenance of peace and security in Europe as a priority. This took second place in the list of priorities of the Union, just behind the fight against unemployment (European Commission 2001: 33).

In 2003 another survey aimed at studying Europeans' views of common foreign, security and defense policies. This time the candidate countries were surveyed in addition to the member states in anticipation of the enlargements in 2004 and 2007. A common foreign policy was approved of by 67% of respondents with only 19% opposing it. Supporters of a common security and defense policy

---

<sup>7</sup> BSE is a disease in cattle which is also known as "mad-cow disease". It can spread to humans.

numbered even more: 74% of all respondents with only 15% opposing it. The strongest support for both issues was to be found in Luxemburg, Italy and Greece. The UK reported the lowest level of support for the common policies, with less than half of the respondents favoring this notion. Similarly, support was very low in Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Denmark. With Austria reporting below average levels of support, traditionally neutral countries were found at the bottom, with Denmark and the UK being the exceptions (Eurobarometer 2003). Support in the thirteen candidate countries (including Turkey) stood at 64% for the common foreign policy and 71% in favor of a common security and defense policy (Eurobarometer 2003).

Current figures from autumn 2010 concerning common foreign, defense and security policies are in line with the older figures. Three quarters of Europeans (75%) are in favor of having a common defense and security policy among EU member states. 17% oppose this idea. 65% support a common foreign policy while 25% are against it (Eurobarometer 2011: 59).

On the subject of a common security and defense policy in Europe Manigart (2001: 20f.) concludes that it is not really possible to speak of a convergence of European public opinion with regards to this topic. Public opinion often corresponds with that of the respective governments. However, according to the author it is not possible to answer the question as to whether it is public opinion that influences the government's position or vice versa (Manigart 2001: 20f.).

An important aspect to consider is the feeling of belonging and the image of Europe. History and Culture is what makes Europe Europe. Having analyzed the perceptions of its identity and the feeling of being European, one can conclude that there is a division between a very large South and a very small North (Debomy 2001: 5). The "South" consists of a large majority of member states as well as candidate countries mainly located in the south, center and east of Europe. People are strongly aware of Europe as a cultural and historical entity, which forms a unique foundation with humanistic values and is placed in contrast to the United States (Debomy 2001: 5). A few countries in the North do not share

this opinion. The concept of roots and cultural proximity has by far fewer supporters in this area. In the UK many citizens do not consider themselves Europeans. Dutch, Danish and, to a certain extent, Swedish people value their own model of society very highly and do not perceive many commonalities with southern countries. Some Estonians and some Czechs share these views. Historical reasons (religion, family structures, occupation) are named as possible explanations. According to the author, the North-South divide had even deepened in the 15 years leading up to that study (Debomy 2001: 5).

The analysis of perceptions and identities has brought interesting results. These will have to be taken into account when explaining the evolution of the European Union and especially policies in the context of foreign and security policy, which are directly affected by the conflict in Yugoslavia. As pointed out above, national policymakers are not always detached from public opinion and sentiment in their respective countries. With regard to the CFSP, Karen Smith (2004: 15) underlines that “public awareness of the CFSP may be growing, sparked by the Yugoslav fiasco”. The question of collective identities is crucial for constructivists. While there is a majority of people seeing themselves at least partly as European, it does not seem possible to draw a general conclusion from this fact. The situation differs from country to country which is crucial for decision-making as many fundamental decisions have to be made unanimously. Nevertheless the institutions created in Brussels also play an essential role in the process. Decades of cooperation in Europe may have generated a common identity and Ole Waever asserts that the “EU Council has become a Euro-organ; often acting according to EU interests” (Waever in Smith 2004: 16).

It has become clear that it is not only the population in the member states that plays a role but also the interaction of member states and the common institutions of the EU. The analysis has shown that there are crucial differences among Europeans regarding their identities. However, the situation in the Council might differ from this. Even in the early years of its existence, it was observed that a cooperative atmosphere was prevalent in the Council, where governments were prepared to negotiate until a consensus was found (Haas in Smith 2004:

18). This can also be regarded as the evolution of a collective identity because member states have similar views of how the Union should work. Moreover, despite low support of membership in some countries, no one has ever left the Union at this point.

Peterson (1998: 3f.) deems it plausible that “European interests” were much more likely to exist during the time of the Cold War when it was comparably easy to bring different national interests together due to the common threat of the Soviet Union. In the context of a common foreign policy, the author states that there cannot be one if there is no “European public”. The analysis of the studies has underlined the fact that there is not a unique view of Europe among the population. Different priorities and ideas are prevalent among citizens of European countries; these differences are especially prevalent in the North and the South. There is no single coherent world vision in Europe – a fact which makes a common foreign policy problematic (Rifkind in Aggestam 1999).

## **6.2 Evolution of Common Foreign and Security Policies**

In this part, the EU as an actor will be scrutinized. The discussion will begin with the conflict in Yugoslavia and the perceptions of the Union in this context, and end with current developments. Especially important will be foreign and security policy because it is relevant for Yugoslavia.

The end of the Cold War forced new responsibilities upon the EU. This process happened quite abruptly and did not leave a lot of time for preparation. Additionally, as the EU was now confronted with a totally new situation in Eastern Europe, which required new policies, it was faced with the well-established customs of national foreign policy-making (Peterson 1998: 17). The only existing common instrument in this field was the EPC, which had been established in 1970. Its aims were quite limited. Member states were supposed to consult with each other on a regular basis in order to develop a mutual understanding of international problems, to harmonize national views, to coordinate positions and, if desired or possible, take action together. The EPC was established to balance the Community’s economic power, to speak with one voice in international affairs

and as a step towards political union (Smith 2004: 8). It was constructed in a way that both supranationalists and intergovernmentalists were able to agree to it. This meant that the EPC was kept separate from the Community and only the Commission played a role in the process (Smith 2004: 8). The SEA which came into effect brought the first amendments to the EPC. Discussions on the political and economic aspects of security were now included (Sjursen 1998: 99). This implies that both aspects of foreign and security policy were now part of the EPC.

At the start of the crisis in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s the EPC was still in effect. Until then the evolution of the coordination of foreign and security policy at the European level took place mostly behind closed doors and unnoticed by national parliaments. It was therefore a comparably discreet process with few concrete decisions and little expenditure with ministers of member governments usually operating on two levels, one away from the public and the second before their national parties, the press and public (Hill/Wallace 1996: 6f.). This changed with the crisis emerging in the Balkans. The Community had already been deeply divided over the Gulf War and the same happened in Yugoslavia when no common positions could be reached. The Balkans are situated in Europe, triggering public interest and showcasing the Community's limitations as an actor in foreign policy (Salmon, in Cottey 2007: 79f.; 83). Expectations had been raised after the end of the Cold War that the EU was now the primary power on the European continent and it was regarded as an international actor by the outside world. Moreover, most of the EU member states had the ambition to play such a role (Peterson/Sjursen 1998: 170). Three factors came together to force these heightened expectations: Firstly, the Maastricht Treaty with commitments to EMU and CFSP which promised European integration at a much faster pace, secondly the Bush-government in the US had a favorable view of European integration, and thirdly the civil war in Yugoslavia presented an opportunity for the EU to speak with a single voice and to act as a single actor (Peterson/Sjursen 1998: 171).

The CFSP was included in the Maastricht Treaty which was agreed on during the IGC in 1991. The Treaty was aimed at preparing a political union,

“strengthen[ing] the institutional framework binding a newly united Germany and better equip[ping] the new Union to lead in the post-Cold War era” (Smith 2004: 8). Peterson (1998: 3f.) identifies three fundamental faults in the CFSP as it was included in the Treaty. First of all there is a lack of identity in the EU which means that a common foreign policy cannot subsist without a European public. The second problem is one of interests. As mentioned earlier, common interests were much more difficult to define after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The third defect of the CFSP is its weak institutions.

The EU immediately faced difficulties with the setup of its newest pillar when crucial decisions on Yugoslavia had to be taken. The case of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia is widely regarded as a prime example of a failure of EU foreign policy. The member states gave in to German demands for early recognition even though many of them had different opinions. Germany put pressure on the others because of domestic demands in the country. As with the EPC before it, the first priority of the CFSP is to maintain consensus at all costs, and not to solve a problem. Furthermore the EU had no independent planning or analysis unit which would have been able to challenge the German view of the situation. Therefore the members agreed to give in to Germany, a decision that brought up more problems later on (Peterson/Sjursen 1998: 172). Intergovernmentalism is the key feature of the CFSP which makes it complicated to find common ground in many areas. This is a sign of how valuable foreign and security policy is to the member states. Cottey (2007: 83f.) comes to the conclusion that the CFSP depends on the EU member states, especially its largest members, to share common views. The prerequisite for common EU action is consensus among the UK, France and Germany.

NATO and the transatlantic relationship with the US played an important role in the development of common foreign and security policies in the EU. Several member states were not members of NATO while others such as France were critical towards US and NATO-involvement in Europe. These factors led to the attractiveness of an independent European policy in the area of security. On the other hand, the UK had close ties to the US and did not want to jeopardize them.

In the end NATO had to remain part of the picture because member states did not want to commit to the necessary financial means that it would take to replace NATO's capabilities in Europe as they were preparing for the EMU (Sjursen 1998: 106ff.).

The Amsterdam Treaty which was signed in 1997 brought some changes to the CFSP as a direct result of experiences from the previous years. From this point on a High Representative for Foreign Policy and a Political and Security Committee (PSC) which was based in Brussels were supposed to make the CFSP more effective and faster in taking decisions. The PSC is active on a daily basis compared to the previous Political Committee which only met once a month. Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, became High Representative and had the task to assist the Presidency in questions of foreign and security policy and represent the EU and its CFSP in the world (Cameron 2003: 117).

The next reform came with the Treaty of Lisbon which was signed in 2007. Two years before this the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected by French and Dutch voters which made it necessary to negotiate a new treaty. The hierarchy of the institutions has not been changed but the High Representative has been given a decidedly more important role. He or she is now titled "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" and also "Vice-President of the European Commission". The HR will replace the Presidency as the key force of the CSFP. The tasks include coordinating, directing and implementing the CSFP as well as representing the Union with third parties (Whitman 2008: 5f.). Whitman (2008: 8) concludes that the Lisbon Treaty "revamps, rather than revolutionizes the existing agreements for the CFSP/ESDP". According to him a lot will depend on how the HR will be able to make use of the additional power this post brings with it. Regarding the member states, two Declarations have been added that allow governments to give the impression that nothing has changed for national foreign policies in case they run into trouble with ratification. As the Lisbon Treaty has just come into force, final judgments on the effect on the CSFP/ESDP will have to wait.

At this point it seems convenient to bring theory back into the picture which offers help in explaining the development of policymaking. Liberal intergovernmentalism takes into account domestic influences and intergovernmental decision-making. Smith (2004: 15) points out that during most of the time of the EPC domestic pressures did not interfere. However, this might have changed with the failure of the EU in Yugoslavia which raised public awareness of the CFSP. She concludes that “domestic-level pressures must thus be taken into account in explaining EU foreign policymaking” (Smith 2004: 15). Constructivism offers a different perspective. While a collective European identity does not seem to exist or is at least not very strong, Aggestam identifies a kind of “Europeanization” of foreign policies among the larger member states France, Germany and Britain (Aggestam, in Sjørusen 2003: 16). There is an atmosphere of cooperation, consultation and interaction in the European Council and the other institutions where the member states come together which leads to this effect (Sjørusen 2003: 16f.). Smith (2004: 18ff.) considers constructivism valid in this case as well. According to her, “constructivist and neo-functionalist insights help to explain how identity can change in the process of interaction” and suggest that decisions are the median of different national preferences, or even an EU preference which could be described as a supranational style of decision-making.

### **6.3 US, NATO and Russia**

Bill Clinton became President of the US in 1993 and stayed in office for eight years. His administration therefore was one of the main actors trying to solve the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Richard Holbrooke, an Assistant Secretary of State for Europe in the mid-1990s who had earlier been Ambassador to Germany and later became Ambassador to the UN, especially focused his work on Bosnia. He argued that Europe needed a new security structure after the end of the Cold War because the continent had been the center of two World Wars. Central Europe would be the key to this structure as it was “the seedbed of more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any other area on the continent” (Holbrooke 1995: 40f.).

After the end of the Cold War the American public was very skeptical towards heavy American involvement in Europe so President Clinton aimed at encouraging his key European allies to take more responsibility (Walt 2000: 67). NATO was to be the fundamental security pillar of the new Europe. Expansion of the alliance into the East was the strategy. Nevertheless, the new architecture was supposed to not only involve NATO but also the EU which was regarded as a vital partner due to its successful and peaceful history in Western Europe (Holbrooke 1995: 42ff.). NATO was the first to expand because the Americans feared that the EU would take too long to integrate new members and that this situation would have left the newly democratic states vulnerable to a “fall back into new darkness” (Holbrooke 1997: 100). Many Europeans opposed further dependence on the US which led to increased efforts to strengthen European capabilities in the field of foreign and security policy. Being aware of this fact and the reluctance at home of sending Americans to die in Europe, the Clinton administration was at first less than eager to become too heavily involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia. However, when the Europeans were not able to solve the problem on their own, the Americans stepped in and took the lead in stopping the violence (Walt 2000: 68). The Clinton administration was of the opinion that not only NATO, the EU and the OSCE would be able to guarantee a truly stable security framework in Europe: the former Soviet states and Russia would have to be part of the security architecture which is why it was crucial that Russia took on an important role in the efforts to bring peace to Yugoslavia (Holbrooke 1995: 50).

Bringing in Russia was a difficult task. Russians and Serbs were both Orthodox Slavs and traditional allies. Moreover, due to political instability in the new Russia, leading Russian politicians feared “a xenophobic backlash in Russian politics” if the West was to take military action against the Serbs and therefore blocked any actions by the UN concerning this matter (Talbot 2002: 73f.). The fear of the expansion of American influence towards the borders of Russia and the rise of the influence of Islam if Bosnia became a Muslim state contributed to the Russian reluctance to take action against the Serbs (Talbot 2002: 77f.).

The West was unable to find a solution to stop the fighting. As the reports of atrocities and massacres mounted, public pressure on Western politicians to act grew. Attacks on a UN safe area allowed NATO to bomb Serb forces under a UN resolution to which Russia had previously agreed (Talbot 2002: 121ff.). A turning point came in summer of 1995 when Serb forces massacred thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica and conducted a mortar attack on a market in Sarajevo. It became impossible for Americans and their allies to ignore the situation so they began an air campaign even though Russia strongly opposed any military action against the Serbs. Elections were due in Russia the next year and President Yeltsin feared that allowing NATO to bomb fellow Slavs would greatly reduce his chances of being re-elected and of keeping Communist and Nationalist forces away from power (Talbot 2002: 169ff.). The West had to take the situation in Russia into account because it was not in its interest to strengthen anti-democratic forces in the country or to cut ties with Russia. Therefore everything was done to make sure to include the Russians in the Dayton agreement which brought peace and an international peacekeeping force to Bosnia (Talbot 2002: 187f.).

Kosovo posed the next obstacle. The Americans and NATO wanted tough resolutions against Yugoslavia but for a variety of reasons Russia did not approve these actions. Apart from the ones named in the Bosnian case, Russia feared that if Kosovo gained independence, republics in the Caucasus would follow suit especially as there was already war in Chechnya (Talbot 2002: 298ff.). NATO eventually went ahead with military action despite Russian protests because, due to press reports of massacres and ethnic cleansing, the public pressure to act was immense. Yugoslavia finally gave in to a NATO ultimatum and surrendered. A peacekeeping force under NATO command, and which included Russian soldiers, moved into Kosovo to protect the peace (Talbot 2002: 330ff.).

These paragraphs show that many aspects had to be taken into account when it came to taking action in Bosnia and Kosovo. It was not only the aforementioned actors that have been analyzed in-depth, but also the US, NATO and especially

Russia which were heavily involved in the context of conflict resolution in former Yugoslavia. Inner-country factors also weighed into the equation as public pressure in the US (“CNN effect”) or the instable political situation in Russia demonstrated.

## 7. Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation was to analyze the evolution of the EU in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the accompanying common foreign and security policy. Therefore, the main actors within the Union, namely France, Germany and the UK, as well as the EU itself have been closely analyzed in terms of their perceptions and identities. The first research question looked at whether the EU as an umbrella has changed the national actors’ perceptions over the years. The second research question aimed at identifying and explaining the dynamics that were behind the evolution of the EU from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty of Lisbon especially with regard to the decision-making process and foreign policy.

The theoretical part mainly dealt with leading theories of European integration and International Relations. Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism basically argue against each other with each claiming the other is obsolete or not even a theory. Having examined the discussion with the help of further literature, it became obvious that both theories can be useful to explain different phenomena. It depends on the area concerned. In addition, constructivism was presented as other theories do not offer enough help to explain the crucial factor of identity and perception which is an essential part of this dissertation. This proved to be valuable in understanding and making clear the development of and reasons behind actors’ behavior.

The theoretical chapters provided the basis for the analysis of the actors in the main part. A close examination of several studies and surveys conducted by Eurobarometer for the European Commission brought interesting results. While it

seems far-fetched to speak of a collective European identity, there are tendencies in many countries to accept the EU as an actor that can better deal with some issues than the nation states. This is the case for a CFSP. However, the population of the UK has been and still is very skeptical towards giving up national policies. A transfer of competences in foreign and security policies from national sovereignty to the EU has always been met with opposition from the British people. However, the government of the UK wanted to be part of the development of a CFSP. This can be explained by the fact that only involvement could guarantee the influence that was crucial for the UK government. Furthermore, a certain kind of “Europeanization” among the larger member states’ foreign policies can be detected (Aggestam 1999). Constant coordination, consultation and interaction on the EU-level over the years following the inception of the EPC have changed the culture of acting. Member states recognize the potential of the EU’s combined influence even though they argue occasionally against it for the sake of a domestic audience in the case of Britain. France and Britain are two special cases. They are the only members of the EU who have a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This gives them influence and power. Both states still want to be players in the world and have this self-perception. Nevertheless, their governments know that they also need the EU. Sometimes they aim at multiplying their own powers by using the CFSP but on other occasions they are simply not able to act alone and need the support of the Union when it comes to foreign policy.

Concerning results for the second research question, several dynamics can be identified that had a direct influence on the evolution of the EU. First of all public pressure led the EU to become involved in Yugoslavia. This involvement proved that the tools the Union had at its disposal were not adequate. The EPC and the CFSP of the Maastricht Treaty could not solve the differences of the member states and the EU had to rely on other actors such as NATO and the US. The relations with these two actors were of crucial importance to the development of the Union. Countries like France want to distance themselves from the Americans while the British are very close to them. Germany is kind of torn in the

middle. Nevertheless, EU members aimed at more independence from the capacities of NATO and the US in order to be able to not repeat the situation in Yugoslavia where only the intervention of the US brought progress. The EU has always been regarded as a civilian power. During the times of the Cold War, that was enough but afterwards the Union had to take on more responsibility because otherwise it would not be able to deal with issues such as the conflict in Yugoslavia.

A crucial factor that has an impact on perceptions is public awareness. When the public became aware of and well-informed about a conflict, it demanded action from the government and put pressure on it. This has usually forced governments to take decisions and to look for all available possibilities. The development of a CFSP is such a case. Yugoslavia was a factor that influenced the perceptions of the public and it started a dynamic of change in the EU. The failure by the Union led to further reforms. However, several other factors played an important role, such as the influence of the US, which was not appreciated by many Europeans and, therefore, sparked further amendments in order to ensure greater European independence from the superpower. To the proponents of this way, the perception of Europe was to be the opposite of America. The interplay of various key factors led to the dynamics which have been presented in this analysis.

In addition, many EU-citizens wanted more responsibility for the EU in the field of common foreign and security policies. As pointed out earlier, this was not the case in all member states but it can surely be noted in the affected states. Smaller members especially can use common policies to multiply their influence if they conduct their policy correctly. The analysis has shown that usually the three most influential states are France, the UK and Germany. They need to agree on important issues in order to make the CFSP really relevant. The system of cooperation and consultation, however, leaves possibilities for other members to exert influence. Another factor that should not be counted out is the economic factor. Cooperation is cheaper and, especially in the time of economic crisis,



governments look for opportunities to reduce spending. The example of France and Britain who signed a cooperation agreement in 2010 underlines this finding.

The Lisbon Treaty is too new to be able to deliver a final judgment on it. Looking back at the development it is possible to detect the constant evolution of the EU. Certainly there were only very small steps into the direction of more common policies but the experience has shown that the day-to-day work in Brussels leads to more Europeanization. While France and Britain have demonstrated that they want to remain players in the world, they are also dependent on the EU in many cases. Therefore, the slow development will probably continue and there might be even some occasional steps back, but all member states know that their influence together is in most cases larger than their influence as single actors.

Looking at the current developments regarding the former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia are all aiming at membership in the EU. This is an enormous development because not long ago violent conflicts took place in that area. The situation with Kosovo has still not been resolved. Nevertheless, the fact that these states are in the process of adjusting their political systems in order to conform to EU standards shows the influence of socialization which has been examined in the theoretical part. The EU is a force of attraction and even though intergovernmentalists and supranationalists will continue to argue about the right direction to take, the progress of EU policies, and particular foreign and security policies, will go on.

This dissertation certainly has its limits. Considering the long period of time from the beginning of the 1990s until now, a lot of things have happened. There is certainly enough material to conduct much more research in this area. Having carefully selected areas of interest and analyzed them, it can be stated that this paper offers a valuable contribution to the field of research. The combination of perceptions and identities with the evolution of the EU; and the factor of the conflict in Yugoslavia as an example of dynamics, provided results that allow us to provide an outlook on the future of EU development in the field of CFSP.

## References

1. Aggestam, Lisbeth. 1999. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy." ARENA Working Paper, WP 99/8. Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99\\_8.htm](http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm))
2. Aggestam, Lisbeth. 2000. "Germany." In *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
3. Ahrne, Göran and Nils Brunsson. 2005. "Organizations and Meta-organizations." *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, Vol. 21, Issue 4.
4. Archer, Clive. 2001. *International Organizations*. Third Edition. New York: Routledge.
5. BBC NEWS. 2007. "EU constitution: Where member states stand." BBC NEWS. Retrieved 10 April 2011. (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm>)
6. Blair, Tony. 2001. "Britain's role in Europe." Speech to the European Research Institute, 23 November 2001. Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://www.xs4all.nl/~adampost/AP\\_Headlines/AP\\_hln\\_Dossier\\_Europe/speeches/UK\\_PM\\_Blair\\_speech\\_nov232001.htm](http://www.xs4all.nl/~adampost/AP_Headlines/AP_hln_Dossier_Europe/speeches/UK_PM_Blair_speech_nov232001.htm))
7. Blair, Tony. 2002. "A Clear Course for Europe." 28 November 2002. Retrieved 2 May 2011. (<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1739>)
8. Blunden, Margaret. 2000. "France." In *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
9. Bodenstern, Joanna Lucia. 2002. *Frankreichs Antwort auf das Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts: Die Reaktion des Politischen Systems auf den Umbruch*. Münster: LIT.
10. Brown, Gordon. 2007. "Gordon Brown on the Treaty of Lisbon." Speech to the House of Commons, 17 December 2007. Retrieved 2 May 2011. ([http://www.eunow.eu/Gordon\\_Brown\\_treaty\\_lisbon.html](http://www.eunow.eu/Gordon_Brown_treaty_lisbon.html))
11. Bundesregierung. 2003. "Europas Stimme in der Welt Stärken." Retrieved 3 May 2011. (<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/artikel/87/475587/multi.htm>)
12. Cameron, Fraser. 2003. "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2003, Vol. IX, Issue 2.
13. Cottey, Andrew. 2007. *Security in the New Europe*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
14. Debomy, Daniel. 2001. "Perceptions of the European Union. A Qualitative Study of the Public's Attitudes to and Expectations of the European Union in the 15 Member States and in 9 Candidate Countries. Summary of Results." Retrieved 29 April. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/quali/ql\\_perceptions\\_summary\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/ql_perceptions_summary_en.pdf))
15. Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty. 2010. "Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation." Retrieved 3 May 2011.



(<http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3706546/3892733/21824849/TrFrance1.2010DefenceSec>)

16. de La Serre, Françoise. 1996. "France: The Impact of François Mitterrand." In *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, edited by Christopher Hill. London and New York: Routledge.

17. Eurobarometer. 1993. "The European Community and United Germany in Autumn 1992. Development of Public Opinion in East and West Germany." Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_071\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_071_en.pdf))

18. Eurobarometer. 2003. "Support for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is Reinforced." Retrieved 6 May 2011. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/notes/csf\\_pesc\\_papr03\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/notes/csf_pesc_papr03_en.pdf))

19. Eurobarometer. 2010. "Eurobarometer 73. Public Opinion in the European Union. Report Volume 1." Retrieved 15 May 2011. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73\\_vol1\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_vol1_en.pdf))

20. Eurobarometer. 2011. "Standard Eurobarometer 74. Public Opinion in the European Union. Autumn 2010." Retrieved 15 May 2011. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74\\_publ\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_publ_en.pdf))

21. European Commission. 2001. "How Europeans see themselves. Looking through the Mirror with Public Opinion Surveys." Retrieved 4 May 2011. ([http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu\\_documentation/05/txt\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/05/txt_en.pdf))

22. Financial Times. 2011. "French president's military interventions are logical." *Financial Times*, Comment/Editorial, 10 April 2011. Retrieved 10 May 2011. (<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e3541de-63b7-11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.html#axzz1MztwFKmM>)

23. Forster, Anthony. 2000. "Britain." In *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, edited by Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

24. General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. 2009. "Information Note: Treaty of Lisbon." Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf))

25. Ginsberg, Roy H. 2001. *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

26. Grant, Charles. 1996. "Strength in Numbers. Europe's Foreign and Defence Policy." Centre for European Reform. Retrieved 30 April 2011. ([http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p025\\_strength\\_grant.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p025_strength_grant.pdf))

27. Hill, Christopher. 1996. "United Kingdom: Sharpening Contradictions." In *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, edited by Christopher Hill. London and New York: Routledge.

28. Hill, Christopher and William Wallace. 1996. "Introduction: Actors and Actions." In *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, edited by Christopher Hill. London and New York: Routledge.

29. Holbrooke, Richard. 1995. "America, a European Power." *Foreign Affairs*, March – April 1995, Vol. 74, No. 2.

30. Holbrooke, Richard. 1997. "Marooned in the Cold War". *An Exchange*. *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1997/1998, Vol. 14, No. 4.

31. Jeong, Ho-Won. 2000. *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
32. Juppé, Alain. 1995. "Quel Horizon pour la Politique Étrangère de la France?" *Politique Étrangère*, 1995, No. 1.
33. Kaldor, Mary. 2001. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Oxford: Blackwell.
34. Kjeldsen, Dennis. 2007. *European Union Foreign Policy: The EU as a Capable International Actor*. Aalborg University. Retrieved 13 March 2011. (projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/7820595/dennis\_kjeldsen.doc)
35. Kohl, Helmut. 1983. "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl. Auszug betreffend Europa und die Europäische Union. 4. Mai 1983." Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?menu\\_sel=17&menu\\_sel2=132&menu\\_sel3=&menu\\_sel4=&msg=607](http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?menu_sel=17&menu_sel2=132&menu_sel3=&menu_sel4=&msg=607))
36. Kohl, Helmut. 1991. "Regierungserklärung zur Lage und Entwicklung in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien. 4. September 1991." Retrieved 3 May 2011. ([http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?menu\\_sel=17&menu\\_sel2=132&menu\\_sel3=&menu\\_sel4=&msg=1409](http://helmut-kohl.kas.de/index.php?menu_sel=17&menu_sel2=132&menu_sel3=&menu_sel4=&msg=1409))
37. Kramer, Steven Philip. 2006. "The End of French Europe?" *Foreign Affairs*, Jul. – Aug. 2006, Vol. 85, No. 4.
38. Kupferschmidt, Frank. 2007. "The United Kingdom between Transatlantic Relationship and European Integration. Pragmatism Put to the Test." *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Working Paper*. Retrieved 25 April 2011. ([http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/kpm\\_UK\\_text\\_format\\_ks\\_.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/kpm_UK_text_format_ks_.pdf))
39. Macleod, Alex. 1997. "French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership." *International Journal*, Spring 1997, Vol. 52, No. 2.
40. Major, John. 1991. "Mr Major's Commons Statement on Maastricht." Retrieved 25 April 2011. (<http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page862.html>)
41. Manigart, Philippe. 2001. "Public Opinion and European Defense." Retrieved 29 April. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_146\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_146_en.pdf))
42. Merkel, Angela. 2007. "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zur Unterzeichnung des Vertrags von Lissabon und zum Europäischen Rat. 27.12.2007." Retrieved 2 May 2011. ([http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_915686/Content/DE/Archiv16/Regierungserklaerung/2007/2007-12-12-regierungserklaerung-merkel.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_915686/Content/DE/Archiv16/Regierungserklaerung/2007/2007-12-12-regierungserklaerung-merkel.html))
43. Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Oxford: Polity Press.
44. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, December 1993, Vol. 31, No. 4.
45. Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2005. *Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History*. New York: Longman.

46. Peterson, John (1998): "Introduction: the European Union as a global actor". In *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*, edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen. London and New York: Routledge.
47. Peterson, John and Helene Sjursen. 1998. "Conclusion: The myth of the CFSP?" In *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*, edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen. London and New York: Routledge.
48. Rummel, Reinhardt. 1996. "Germany's role in the CFSP: 'Normalität' or 'Sonderweg'?" In *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, edited by Christopher Hill. London and New York: Routledge.
49. Sandholtz, Wayne and Alec Stone Sweet. 2010. "Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance." Forthcoming in the *Oxford Handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 16 April 2011. (<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585123>)
50. Sarkozy, Nicolas. 2008. "NATO summit – Speech by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic." France in the United Kingdom: French Embassy. Retrieved 6 May 2011. (<http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-speaks-at.html>)
51. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." In *European Integration Theory*, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52. Schuman, Robert. 1950. "Schuman Declaration 9 May 1950." Retrieved 10 April 2011. (<http://www.schuman.info/9May1950.htm>)
53. Sjursen, Helene. 1998. "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy?: The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy." In *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*, edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen. London and New York: Routledge.
54. Sjursen, Helene. 2003. "Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs." ARENA Working Paper 09/03. Retrieved 30 March 2011. ([http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2003/wp03\\_9.pdf](http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2003/wp03_9.pdf))
55. Smith, Karen E. 2004. *The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Eastern Europe*. Second Edition, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
56. Talbott, Strobe. 2002. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*. New York: Random House.
57. Védérine, Hubert. 1996. *Les Mondes de Francois Mitterand*. Paris: Fayard.
58. Walt, Stephen M. 2000. "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, Mar. – Apr. 2000, Vol. 79, No. 2.
59. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization*, Spring 1992, Vol. 46, No. 2.
60. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
61. Whitman, Richard G. 2008. "Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: Significant or Cosmetic Reforms?" *Global Europe Papers*, 2008/1. Retrieved 25 March 2011. (<http://www.bath.ac.uk/esml/research/security/pdf/whitman.pdf>)

## Appendix I: Timeline of the Conflict in Yugoslavia

Summer 1991

Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from Yugoslavia and ethnic Serbs begin fighting in Croatia. The U.N. imposes an arms embargo on all members of the former Yugoslav Republic.

Spring 1992

Bosnia-Herzegovina (44% Muslim, 32% Serbian, 17% Croatian) declares independence, and is recognized by the West. Bosnian Serbs declare an independent Serbian Republic within Bosnia. Ethnic tensions explode and war erupts in Bosnia. Serb-led Yugoslavia is expelled by the U.N.

Summer 1992

Reports of “ethnic cleansing” – a policy of killing or driving away inhabitants to create ethnically “pure” areas – against Muslims in Bosnia.

Winter 1992-1993

Serb forces block U.N. humanitarian convoys to Muslim enclaves in Bosnia. Several Bosnian cities are declared “Safe Areas” by the U.N. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which proposes dividing Bosnia along ethnic lines, is rejected by the Bosnian Serb Parliament. Croats, originally fighting with Muslims against the Serbs, begin their own ethnic cleansing campaign.

Fall 1993

The Bosnian army makes some territorial gains against Croatian separatists. The breakaway Serbian Republic of Bosnia orders a general mobilization among all Bosnian Serb refugees.

February 4, 1994

The bombing of a marketplace in Sarajevo, which leaves 68 people dead and over 200 wounded, ignites public outcry against this and other atrocities.

Summer 1994

The Bosnian government army makes advances against Serbian forces, recapturing some of the territory around Bihac, in the northeast corner of Bosnia.

Fall 1994

Serb troops retake the region around Bihac. NATO bombs runways in the Serb-controlled airport in Krajina in retaliation. Over 300 U.N. troops are held hostage by the Serbs.



July 11, 1995

The U.N. "Safe Area" Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia is captured by Serbs. 6000 Muslim men are killed in the worst massacre in Europe since WWII.

August-September 1995

Croatian forces capture the Krajina area from the Serbs and force local Serbs to flee in a massive ethnic cleansing operation. NATO air attacks on Bosnian Serbs are carried out. The parties agree to peace talks.

November 1995

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia sign the Dayton Peace Accord to end the war in Bosnia. NATO peacekeeping forces are sent to Bosnia.

March 1998

Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia, sends troops to suppress unrest in Kosovo. A guerilla war with the Kosovo Liberation Army ensues. Milosevic rejects calls for international involvement.

September 1998

NATO issues an ultimatum to Milosevic: Stop attacks on Kosovo Albanians or face airstrikes.

March 1999

The Kosovo Albanians and Yugoslavia do not succeed in coming to agreement in Paris. NATO airstrikes begin throughout Yugoslavia. Thousands of Kosovo Albanians flee to Albania, which creates a massive refugee crisis.

May 1999

Milosevic indicted as war criminal by U.N. war crimes tribunal.

June 1999

Serbia starts to withdraw troops from Kosovo leading NATO to suspend bombing after 78 days. The U.N. takes over administration in the province and sets up a Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (Kfor). NATO forces arrive in the province.

September 2000

Vojislav Kostunica receives more votes than Milosevic in the presidential elections, but the federal elections commission denies this fact. Kostunica supporters reject the findings, and begin a campaign of strikes and civil disobedience to force Milosevic to step down.

October 2000



A rally in front of the Parliament ends with protesters storming the building and setting it on fire. Milosevic admits defeat a day later and Kostunica is sworn in as president.

June-July 2001

Milosevic is handed over to the tribunal in The Hague to probe charges of war crimes.

February 2003

Yugoslav parliament decides to approve a constitutional charter for a Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Croatia submits a formal application for EU membership.

October 2005

Serbia and Montenegro begins talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, regarded as a preliminary step on the long road to membership.

June 2006

Montenegro declares itself independent. Serbia responds by declaring itself the independent sovereign successor state to Serbia and Montenegro.

February 17, 2008

Kosovo declares itself independent which Serbia refuses to recognize. In the meantime, the province is administered by the U.N. Europe's major powers and the United States recognize Kosovo's independence.

September 2008

The parliament of Serbia ratifies a key agreement on closer ties with the European Union, opening up the way to eventual membership.

October 2008

The U.N. General Assembly votes to refer Kosovo's independence declaration to the International Court of Justice.

December 2008

The European Union mission (Eulex) takes over police, justice and customs services from the U.N. in Kosovo. Serbia accepts the EU mission. Montenegro presents its official application for EU membership.

April 2009

Croatia officially joins NATO.

June 2009

A lack of progress in resolving a long-standing border row with neighboring Slovenia leads to the cancellation of the next round of EU membership talks with Croatia

November 2009



Croatian EU membership talks resume after Slovenia ceases blocking the talks. The two countries sign a deal to allow international mediators to resolve their dispute.

July 2010

The International Court of Justice rules that Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 was not illegal under international law. The ruling comes in response to a complaint from Serbia that it had violated its territorial integrity.

November 2010

The European Commission recommends that Montenegro be named as a formal candidate to join the European Union.

March 2011

Serbia and Kosovo begin direct talks to try end their dispute - their first talks since Kosovo broke away from Serbia.

**Sources:**

Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2005. *Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History*. New York: Longman. p. 156f.

BBC News. Timeline Kosovo. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/3550401.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3550401.stm))

BBC News. Timeline Serbia. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/5055726.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/5055726.stm))

BBC News. Timeline Montenegro. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/5075632.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/5075632.stm))

BBC News. Timeline Croatia. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/1097156.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1097156.stm))

## Appendix II: Timeline of European Integration

May 9, 1950

Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes an important speech in which he puts forward proposals based on the ideas of Jean Monnet. He suggests that France and the Federal Republic of Germany pool their coal and steel resources in a new organization. Other European countries are able to join the two.

April 1951

In Paris, six countries — Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — sign the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It enters into force on 23 July 1952, for a period of 50 years.

March 1957

In Rome, the six countries sign the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). They come into force on 1 January 1958.

October 1970

The Member States approve the Davignon report on political cooperation. The intention is to get Europe to speak with a single voice on all major international problems.

January 1973

Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom join the European Communities. Norway stays out, as a consequence of a referendum in which a majority of people voted against membership.

December 1974

At the Paris Summit, the leaders of the nine member states decide to meet three times a year as the European Council. They also give the go-ahead for direct elections to the European Parliament, and agree to set up the European Regional Development Fund.

June 1979

The first direct elections to the 410-seat European Parliament are held.

January 1981

Greece joins the European Communities, bringing the number of members to 10.

January 1986

Spain and Portugal join the European Communities, bringing their membership to 12.



February 1986

The Single European Act is signed in Luxembourg and The Hague and enters into force on 1 July 1987.

December 1991

The Maastricht European Council adopts a Treaty on the European Union, which lays the foundation for a common foreign and security policy, closer cooperation on justice and home affairs and the creation of an economic and monetary union, including a single currency. This system is called “three pillars”.

February 1992

The Treaty on the European Union is signed at Maastricht and comes into force on 1 November 1993.

January 1995

Austria, Finland and Sweden join the EU, which now has 15 members. Norway stays out again as result of a referendum in which a majority of people voted against membership.

October 1997

The Amsterdam Treaty is signed and comes into force on 1 May 1999.

January 1999

Start of the third stage of EMU: 11 EU countries adopt the euro, which is launched on the financial markets, replacing their currencies for non-cash transactions. The European Central Bank takes over responsibility for monetary policy. Greece joins in 2001.

December 2000

The European Council in Nice reaches agreement on the text of a new Treaty. It changes the EU's decision-making system in order to prepare the Union for enlargement. The presidents of the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission proclaim the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

July 2003

The Convention on the Future of Europe finishes its work on the draft of a European Constitution.

May 2004

Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia join the European Union.

October 2004



The European Constitution is adopted in Rome. It is subject to ratification by member states.

May/June 2005

Voters in France reject the Constitution in a referendum, followed three days later by voters in the Netherlands.

October 2005

Accession negotiations begin with Turkey and Croatia.

January 2007

Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union.

December 2007

The 27 EU countries sign the Treaty of Lisbon, which amends the previous Treaties. It aims at making the EU more democratic, efficient and transparent, and thereby able to tackle global challenges such as climate change, security and sustainable development. The Treaty has to be ratified by each of the 27 Member States before it can come into force.

November 2009

Herman Van Rompuy is appointed first permanent President of the EU Council and British Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton is named High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

December 2009

The Lisbon Treaty enters into force.

### **Sources:**

Official Homepage of the European Union. The History of the European Union. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/2000\\_today/2009/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/2000_today/2009/index_en.htm))

([http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/2000\\_today/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/2000_today/index_en.htm))

([http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1970-1979/1970/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1970-1979/1970/index_en.htm))

Official Homepage of the European Union. The EU at a Glance – Europe in 12 Lessons. Key Dates in the History of European Integration. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

([http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/key\\_dates/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/key_dates/index_en.htm))



ZDES Working Papers

Arbeitspapiere des Zentrums für Deutschland- und Europastudien

Рабочие тетради Центра изучения Германии и Европы

Universität Bielefeld – Fakultät für Soziologie  
Postfach 100131 – 33501 Bielefeld – Deutschland

Staatliche Universität St. Petersburg – 7/9 Universitetskaja Nab.  
199034 St. Petersburg – Russland

<http://zdes.spb.ru/>

[info@zdes.spb.ru](mailto:info@zdes.spb.ru)