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Identity beyond the Nation State: the case
of the Russian Germans

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1. Introduction

The following paper called *Identity beyond the Nation State: The case of the Russian Germans* was chosen for various reasons: One reason was to observe if one can speak about the Russian Germans as a group at all. Secondly, what were their reasons to migrate in case they migrated and what are their motives to migrate.

As a starting point of the research it will be necessary to analyze theoretical concepts and approaches concerning identity and group formation as well as concepts concerning migration. The main question is how a group forms or constructs its collective identity. What are the possible reasons why an individual feels themselves as a member of a community? Therefore in the part – *Individual identity* – it will be tried to describe individual identity and hereby the concepts of personal and social identity which make following Erik Erikson “a connection between community and individual”¹ This is the base for concepts of collective identities. In the part - *Collective identities* - it will be tried to describe and discuss two different approaches in regards to collective identity: primordialism and constructivism.

In the chapter *Migration theories* older, more static and unidirectional micro- and macro approaches towards migration will be discussed and then compared to newer approaches that regard migration as a process and see migration not as something unidirectional with a clear end any more. Within the newer theories the focus will lie on the transnational approach. The transnational approach will be chosen as its broader context network theories can be seen as a link that combines in-group formation concepts of belonging or identity and its impact on the formation of transnational social spaces and further on migration decision.

After an overview of the history of the Russian Germans the analysis itself works on three different levels:

1. The macro level: The role of nation states and their official politics concerning the Russian Germans and influences of structures on migration behavior. The focus will lie on both measurements and motives behind these measurements of the German as well as the Russian State today.
2. .The meso level: The role of organizations. Here the so called Russian German meeting centers which are based in Russia will be observed and compared to the

¹ Scott J./ Marshall G.: Oxford dictionary of Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2009. P. 331

Landsmanschaft der Russlanddeutsche an organization that perceives itself as the central organization of all Russian Germans. It will be analyzed why these organizations exist, what they do and who stands behind these organizations today.

3. The micro level: On the third level it will be analyzed how Russian Germans are perceived from outside, meaning by the society that surrounds them in Russia and in Germany on one side and finally how Russian German see themselves and what their own motives for migration were and are.

At the final stage of the analysis it will be tried to show how the theories framing the topic apply to the case of the Russian Germans.

For the analysis of the following paper various information sources are used: official law texts, interviews, data provided by survey institutes as well as literature- and internet research. This all served as the basis for elaborating a standardized questionnaire. The interviews before elaborating the questionnaire took place in various places in Russia and Germany. The questionnaire was put online in March 2010 and could be filled in by the target group in both German and Russian languages. The data was analyzed by using the statistical program SPSS.

2. Identity

2.1. Individual Identity

At first one can describe identity in common as the specific characteristics of a person in relation to themselves and in differentiation to others. Furthermore identity can be understood as a self-reflexive process of an individual of changing self-interpretation and interpretation of oneself by others. This is done for the reason of orientation in a person's life. Erik Erikson describes a formula that can describe identity:

Ein Gefühl der Identität haben heißt, sich mit sich selbst – so wie man wächst und sich entwickelt – eins zu fühlen; und es heißt ferner, mit dem Gefühl einer Gemeinschaft die mit ihrer Geschichte (oder Mythologie) im reinen ist, im Einklang sein.²

Following that description one can identify two major factors when talking about identity, the individual on the one hand and the community or group, in which the individual lives on the other. The individual has – to perceive oneself as “identical” – to fulfill requirements towards her or him.

When talking about individual identity one can further distinguish between personal and social identity.

Personal identity deals with characteristics like physical and mental motivations, capabilities and experiences. Personal identity guarantees the continuity of the being “I or me” in the different, partly contradictory systems of roles the individual is involved in. Thereby it shall be secured that one is today the same person as one was yesterday and the day before yesterday.

When talking about social identity the focus lies on relations between an individual and a group. Hereby the individual, according to social identity theory, tries to create a positive image of oneself. The individual has the want or need to identify oneself with others – with social groups. H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner hereby explain the term “group” as follows:

We can conceptualize a group, [...], as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership in it.³

² Erikson, Erik H.: Dimensionen einer neuen Identität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975.

³ In: Worchel, Stephen [editor]: Psychology of intergroup relations: Nelson Hall, 1986

One can conclude at this that the members of a social group perceive themselves as a part of the same social category. Social categories make it easier for the individual to orientate in a social field.

But social identity is also about the perception of an individual by others. It deals with membership in different reference groups. Which social role does the member play or fulfill within a group and which role does the group expect the individual to play. In the end one agrees to be part of it. Bourdieu⁴ writes in this context about class- or group-habitus, which for him is the expression or reflectance of a class or group. This group-habitus for him is a subjective system of internalized structures of common cognition-, thought- and operational patterns. Identity can also be seen as the sum of identifications of oneself with social groups. This leads to the conclusion that one can have more than one identity, which can be activated according to different contexts. Social identity is furthermore not something static, it is much more an ongoing process.

According to Haller⁵ one can use the term identity not just for individuals but also for groups. Here it is the social identity which links individuals and the group or the collective. Here besides a common denominator within an in-group the boundary to other groups is of great importance.

2.2. Collective Identities – Ethnicity Concepts

Constructivism vs. Primordialism

Sökefeld describes, when writing about collective identities and here mainly in connection with ethnicity and ethnic identity, two different approaches in social sciences: primordialism and constructivism.

Primordialism for him is closely linked to essentialism. Here identities base on a substantial and fundamental alliance. Concepts and discourses according to this approach are pictures of reality. The core of this approach focuses on the continuity of eg.: common culture, common language, common myths and shared memories as the basis of an ethnos or an in-group. As an example Sökefeld names in this context an

⁴ Bourdieu, Pierre: Sozialer Sinn: Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999

⁵ Haller, Max: Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher. Gesellschaftliche Ursachen und Funktionen, Herausbildung und Transformation seit 1945. Nationaler Vergleich. Wien: Böhlau, 1996.

essential “Race”-Theory which implies that “Races” are based on biological characteristics.⁶

Constructivism - which is the current dominating approach and on which this paper is based on as well - on the other side does not see identities as something given but collective identities are social constructs.

How does this happen? Following Frederik Barth the concept of an in-group „[...] implies a sharing criteria for evaluation and judgement”⁷ He also states the recognition of an Other implies limitations to that shared criteria. So there is a „WE“ and „THEY“ or in-group and out-group. Weiss und Reinprecht⁸ state in this context that the feeling of confraternity guarantees unity within the group and differentiation to others outside the group. That means collective identity is derived by interaction with other units. It is the result of the interplay of cultural, normative imaginations and pictures of the own unit, or in-group and imaginations and pictures of the other unit(s), or out-group(s). But these differences are not to be seen as objective differences between the groups, as it is in the primordialistic approach. It is the result of social processes of identification and differentiation.

2.3. Conclusion

Collective identity is not anything that is given by nature. It is about thought communities. It is about such thought memberships and differences as e.g. language, culture, history, religion...- which can be anything and are constant social processes. Collective identities are in this constructive perspective social constructs derived by social discourses and social action.⁹ Primordial relationships only play a role so far as they, as Sökefeld puts it, deliver the Code, which is, as already mentioned above, language, culture... So when it comes to identification of oneself the primordialistic approach does play a role, but only so far that instead of being fixed it is regarded as “quasi-fixed” by Group members to categorize the individuals’ social world. In this regard social identity, which is, as mentioned above, a process itself, can be seen as a link between individual and

⁶ Sökefeld, Martin: Problematische Begriffe: „Ethnizität“, „Rasse“, „Kultur“, „Minderheit“. in: Schmidt-Lauber, Brigitta (Hg.): Ethnizität und Migration: Einführung in Wissenschaft und Arbeitsfelder; Dietrich Reimer Verlag; Berlin: 2007.

⁷ Barth, Frederik: Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Boston: Little Brown and Co.

⁸ Weiss, Hilde / Reinprecht, Christoph: Demokratischer Patriotismus oder ethnischer Nationalismus in Ostmitteleuropa? Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1998.

⁹ Sökefeld, Martin: Problematische Begriffe: „Ethnizität“, „Rasse“, „Kultur“, „Minderheit“. in: Schmidt-Lauber, Brigitta (Hg.): Ethnizität und Migration: Einführung in Wissenschaft und Arbeitsfelder; Dietrich Reimer Verlag; Berlin: 2007.

collective identity. Furthermore collective identities always need the other. For Frederik Barth the only stable element is the boundary between groups.¹⁰ Anything concerning the cultural characteristics of a group can change, but the differentiation between “us” and “them” does not change.

3. Migration

The following chapter deals with classical migration theories on the one hand and newer migration theories on the other. ‘Classical theories’ here means that the focus lies on a single movement from one country to another for permanent settlement. Newer theories challenge this approach and stress that migration itself can be seen as ongoing process. Both classical and newer approaches towards migration can be divided into micro – and macro approaches. Micro approaches, in short, see the individual as an active decision maker whereas macro approaches stress the circumstances that influence, structure or even determine decisions. Within the newer theories one can detect a meso approach that seeks to combine micro - and macro approaches.

3.1. Classical Theories

Micro Approaches

Micro approaches take the individual as the essential actor for their analysis of why people migrate. This approach can be seen as linked to *modernization theory*¹¹. Within this theory there are separated sending- and receiving countries. The individual decides to migrate on the basis of push- and pull factors. According to Heintel, Husar and Spreitzhofer¹² push factors are factors like poverty, war and hunger whereas pull factors are factors like better payment and lack of labor force.

Pries detected inside classical micro approaches three ideal types:¹³

- neoclassical labour migration
- new economy of labor migration
- (individualistic) expectancy value theory

¹⁰ Barth, Frederik: *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Boston: Little Brown and Co.

¹¹ Compare: Brettel C. B.: *Theorizing Migration in Anthropology: The social Construction of Networks, Identities, Communities, and Globalscapes*. In: Brettel C. B/ Hollifield J.F.: *Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines*. Routledge. New York: 2008. p. 118

¹² Wiener Demokratiezentrum : www.demokratiezentrum.org

¹³ Compare : Pries L.: *Internationale Migration*. Transcript. Bielefeld : 2001.

The neoclassical labour migration approach centers the homo economicus and sees the individual actor who decides on a rational basis. Furthermore this approach implies that the individual has full access to information. The second approach, the new economy of labor migration, sees the actor embedded in a network eg. households or families. The main aim here is risk diversification. The individualistic value expectancy approach is based on rational choice theory. The individual takes, according to the information given, the decision he or she benefits most from. All three approaches see economic factors as most important for migration. Only rational choice theory partly sees other benefits than strict economical ones as possible benefits.

Macro Approaches

As a classical macro approach challenging the micro approaches one can see the historical-structuralist approach. This approach does not focus on the motives or calculations made by individuals but see regions and nation states embedded in a complex system of international division of labour and power structures according to Wallerstein's world-system-theory.¹⁴ Hereby the concepts of centre and periphery play an important role as well as development of underdevelopment, meaning that the expansion of industrial organization of work expands more and more which leads to the discharge of labour in developing countries. These people then migrate to big cities inside their respective countries and from there to developed countries. This all happens against the background of expanding capitalism.

Other structural approaches see more than just economic factors when trying to explain migration: Michael Bommers, coming from system theory, sees frameworks deriving from economical, political and legal structures that explain international migration:

[...] migration in modern societies means the effort to find access to social system at a different geographical place by means of migration.¹⁵

Mostly migrants find access to further subsystems via the sub system economy.

All these theories mentioned above have in common that migration is seen as something unidirectional. People migrate from one closed nation state to another in order to settle there permanently.

¹⁴ Compare : Pries L.: Internationale Migration. Transcript. Bielefeld : 2001p. 23

¹⁵ Bommers Michael: Transnationalism or Assimilation? In: http://www.sowi-onlinejournal.de/2005-1/transnationalism_assimilation_bommers.htm (looked after 8.2.2008)

3.2. Newer Theories

Newer theories challenge the idea of nation states as closed containers. Pries writes in this context about the internationalization of socialization. He names seven ideal types:¹⁶

1. Internationalization
2. Re-Nationalization
3. Supranationalization
4. Globalization
5. Glokalisierung
6. Diaspora-Internationalization
7. Transnationalization

All these theories mentioned above stress the circulation of migration movements. Migration cannot be thought of as a strict unidirectional phenomenon. As one of the most prominent newer approaches one can detect the transnationalist approach and its broader context, the social network theory.

Transnationalism

Newer technical possibilities – e.g. eMail, chat, VoIP – as well as easy and relatively cheap transport allow individuals to be part of a community without living in the same place. Anthony Giddens writes in this context of a growing separation of local- and social space since the beginning of modernity, which makes relationships between people possible without the necessity of personal contact.¹⁷ Glick Schiller calls people who constitute such a social space transborder citizens:¹⁸

Transborder citizens are people who live their lives across the borders of two or more nation-states, participating in the normative regime, legal and institutional system and political practices of these various states.¹⁹

In the concrete case of the Russian Germans this would be the Russian Federation on the one hand and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand.

The transnationalist approach focuses on economic, cultural and social relationships which go beyond nation states. This means that social networks or transnational social fields do exist across borders. For Glick-Schiller a transnational social field is a wide field ranging from people who are permanently travelling within a network across nation

¹⁶ Pries Ludger: *Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt: Sozialräume jenseits von Nationalgesellschaften*. Suhrkamp Verlag; Frankfurt am Main: 2008. S 132f.

¹⁷ Giddens; Anthony: *Konsequenzen der Moderne*; Suhrkamp Verlag; Frankfurt am Main; 1996: p. 30.

¹⁸ Giddens; Anthony: *Konsequenzen der Moderne*; Suhrkamp Verlag; Frankfurt am Main; 1996: p. 30.

¹⁹ Nina Glick Schiller, "Transborder Citizenship: an Outcome of Legal Pluralism within Transnational Social Fields" (February 15, 2005). *Department of Sociology, UCLA. Theory and Research in Comparative Social Analysis*. Paper 25.

states to people who only participate indirectly without being mobile at all.²⁰ The important point is that there is a network that goes across nation states and that migrants interact in more than one nation state. Important as well is that they identify themselves with more than one nation state. It is their activities that lead to the development of transnational fields.

Migration is not perceived as unidirectional. Markus Kaiser calls this pluri local social life. The belonging to a group is not locally determined any more. This does not mean that the nation state has lost its power at all in regarding its identification offers although the constructions of belonging often contradict everyday life:

Although the current period of capitalism is marked by new diasporas, identities of migrant populations continue to be rooted in nation states²¹

Contradictory because the “in-betweenes” of the members of transnational social networks cannot be fully articulated by them, because of being mentally deeply rooted in the sending country. A term strongly connected to transnationalism is the term new diaspora. Diasporas following Brettel can be described as people living outside their respective homelands. The difference between diasporas and transnational social fields are mainly concerning the centre. Pries sees diasporas as constructs that have a clear centre whereas transnational social fields are a network, where no clear centre can be detected. But Priest says that international diasporas can easily become transnational fields and the other way round. Both have in common pluri-local social networks and both stress ethnicity to a large extent.

For Brettel both concepts have to be perceived from the broader context of how communities are formed and how people become members of groups. Coming from this direction the focus lies on identity constructs. (see chapter *Identity*)

Regarding migration theories an approach that is similar to the transnationalism approach one can see social network theories. The difference is that network theories do not necessarily need ethnic bonds for explaining networks:

Networks connect migrants across time and space. Once begun, migration flows often become selfsustaining, reflecting the establishment of networks of information, assistance and obligations which develop between migrants in the host society and friends and relatives in the sending area. These networks link

²⁰ Basch Linda, Glick Schiller Nina, Szanton Blanc Christina: Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nationstates; Routledge: 2006.

²¹ Basch Linda, Glick Schiller Nina, Szanton Blanc Christina: Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nationstates; Routledge: 2006. p. 8.

populations in origin and receiving countries and ensure that movements are not necessarily limited in time, unidirectional or permanent.²²

This approach is based on network analysis where the main focus lies on households, networks of kinship and networks of friendship. For Brettel this approach combines micro- and macro approaches towards migration:

„...the effort of the filter of the household not only brings the migrant-as-decision-maker back into focus, but also reintroduces the social and cultural variables that must be considered in conjunction with economic variables.²³

These filters, households and social networks can be seen as something between the individual and society. These networks conciliate structural changes, facilitate migration and stand for the continuation of migration as a self-sustaining process.

3.3. Conclusion

In conclusion one can say that classical migration theories draw a more static picture of migration as well as of societies. Furthermore they see economic factors as dominating factors that explain migration. Newer theories do not perceive migration as something with a clear end any more.

4. Who is Russian German?

According to the information platform of the Russian Germans www.rusdeutsch.ru being a Russian German means the following:

Russian Germans – overall definition for people of German nationality, who through centuries in different groups came to Russia and who lived or still live in regions of the Russian Empire. Life and culture was influenced by these regions, which furthermore shaped the appearance of the very heterogeneous groups of the Russian Germans.²⁴

The organisation „Die Russlanddeutsche Landsmannschaft“ defines Russian Germans in its constitution under § 4 Volksgruppenzugehörigkeit (belonging to the ethnic group):

1. Russian German is a German who was born within the borders of USSR from 1937.
2. People count furthermore as Germans, if at least one parent or grandparent is German or who is married to a Russian German.

²² Boyd M.: Family and Social Network; cited after: Vertovec Stephen: Transnational Networks and Skilled Labour Migration

²³ Brettell C.B.: Theorizing Migration in Anthropology. In: Brettell C.B./ Hollifield J.F.: Migration Theory: Talking about Disciplines. Routledge; New York: 2008. P. 125

²⁴ Compare.: www.rusdeutsch.ru (looked after 18.1.2010 and translated by the author)

3. As Russian German counts furthermore a German, who lived in the territory mentioned in § 4 paragraph 1 for a longer period of time and who evince their solidarity with the ethnic Germans from Russia²⁵

Where the first definition is a very essentialist one, essential meaning here, that nationality and hereby connected to ethnicity is the first and most salient marker of being a Russian German. Hereby it has to be said that nationality does in this definition not mean citizenship but being a descendant of people who originally came from German countries to settle in Russia. Only secondly come the outer circumstances. The second definition is a more open one. It also contains the nationality part, but leaves space to a larger parts of society, eg. if one is married to a Russian German one can be part of the Russian Germans.

5. Why are there Russian Germans in Russia? A brief historical overview

5.1. The beginnings

As a starting point of the history of the Russian Germans in Russia most historians refer to the Germans who settled in Novgorod in the middle ages. Already under Ivan IV. (the terrible) craftsmen from German speaking countries or regions came to Russia. Peter the Great and his successors invited many Russian Germans as well. In the year 1652 the “Nemeckaya Slobod” – “German Suburb” near Moscow was founded.

5.2. Katharina II (1762-1796)

In 1763, Katharina the Great proclaimed the „*manifesto for foreign colonists for settling in Russia*”, this manifesto was also called “the invitation manifesto”. Until 1772 over 30.000 people came to Russia. Most of the colonists settled around Saratov, where between 1763 and 1772 approximately 104 colonies were founded. At the same time some groups settled around St. Petersburg. In the eighties of the 18th Century people from Gdansk and Western Prussia arrived in the Black Sea region. Until 1796 the number of Russian Germans grew up to 297.000 people.

²⁵ Compare: www.deutscheausrussland.de (looked after 18.1.2010 and translated by the author)

5.3. The 19th century

The next big wave of immigrants arrived in the early 19th century. The people arriving settled in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus region. Some groups settled in the Crimea as well as in newly conquered Bessarabia. Another target region was Wolhynia. Furthermore, Mennonites from Western Prussia founded colonies around Samara.

In 1858, 840.000 Russian Germans already lived in the Russian Empire. The last groups of Germans from outside Russia arrived under Alexander II (1855-1881), who stopped the privileges of the Russian Germans. (see picture 5.1 for detailed migration flows).

Picture 5.1: German migration to Russia in 18th and 19th century²⁶

Deutsche Auswanderung nach Russland im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert



²⁶ Source: <http://www.arwela.info/8auswanderung.pdf>

Table 5.1: No. of Russian Germans 1897

Regions ²⁷	Religious Confessions ²⁸
Wolga Region	Lutheranians
New Russia	Katholics
Wolhynia	Mennonites
North incl. St.Petersburg	Reformers
Belorussia Lithuania	Jewish
Northern Caucasus	Orthodox
Central	Chosen ones
Transcaucasus	
Other regions	
Total	

The census also differentiated between urban and rural areas, nearly a quarter of the Russian Germans lived in cities.

5.4. Causes of the migration from the point of view of the Russian German groups

Push- and Pull factors

Table 5.2: Push/ Pull in 18th and 19th Century

Push	Pull
Shortage of Land	Tax shelter
Aftermaths of wars	Autonomy
No religious freedom	Religious freedom
	No military service

Push and Pull factors are possible explanations if the individual is seen as a rational actor who has not only access to full information but is fully informed. One piece of evidence for this model is that the groups which migrated to Russia were informed about the rights they were gaining when settling in Russia. This is due to the fact that Russian officials were travelling around German countries and inviting people to move to Russia. What stands against the theory of strict rational decisions on an economical base is the fact that the Mennonites mainly migrated because of the promise of religious freedom in Russia. This can be drawn from the fact that after the proclamation of

²⁷ Source: немцы россии энциклопедия том 1, ЭРН. Moskau 1999. p. 683

²⁸ Source: немцы россии энциклопедия том 3, ЭРН. Moskau 2006. p. 255

religious freedom large groups of Mennonites moved to Russia. This leads to the conclusion (so far) that economical factors alone cannot sufficiently explain migration.

5.5. After Immigration

After the abolition their privileges in 1871 many German settlers moved further to Canada, USA and South America. Until WWI around 300.000 people left Russia. Other groups moved further to Siberia and Central Asia where they did not have to join military service. Although many people left, the number of Russian Germans grew up 2.4 million people by WWI.

In WWI German settlers from Wolhynia were forced to move to Siberia. This resulted from the so called *liquidation laws*.²⁹ Only the October Revolution prevented this law going further than Wolhynia. The communists proclaimed “the rights of the peoples of Russia”³⁰. Against this background the “Autonomous region of the Wolgagermans“ was founded. Nevertheless around 120.000 German settlers left Russia towards America during the civil war after the revolution.

Whereas the first migration waves can still be perceived to some extent as decisions made by the Russian Germans themselves, one can say that the more it goes towards WWI the more structures play an important role shaping migration. As the peak of the period when structures determined migration one can see the deportations from Wolhynia. Behind all this, concepts of belonging play a significant role: in-group “we the Russians” out-group “the Germans=Enemy”. How quickly contexts can change can be seen in the fact that the situation for Russian Germans changed massively after the October Revolution.

In 1924 the autonomous region of the Wolgagermans became the Autonomous Socialist Sovietrepublic of the Wolgagermans (АССР Немцев Поволжья). In the very same year Josef Stalin became the most powerful person of the Soviet Union. He was also the one who decided to stop the NEP in 1927, which was a measure introduced by Lenin 1921 to overcome famine. Instead of the NEP the first five year plan³¹ was proclaimed. This was also the starting point for the *dekulakization*. In the course of the dekulakization around 350.000 German settlers were deported to Siberia.

²⁹ <http://www.russlanddeutshegeschichte.de/deutsch2/liquidationsgesetze.htm>

³⁰ Stöckl, Günther: *Russische Geschichte*; Körner Verlag, Stuttgart: 1997. p. 661

³¹ Stöckl, Günther: *Russische Geschichte*; Körner Verlag, Stuttgart: 1997. p. 713.

The first census of the SU took place in 1926. According to the census 1.238.549³² people with German as their mother tongue lived in the Soviet Union.

In the early thirties another big famine arrived. Shortly after that Stalin's Great Purge (Большая чистка) started. This was a time of mass terror. Amongst other things the elimination of the old elites of the communist party, army, bureaucracy and the elites of non-Russian nations took place. Millions of people were deported to the Gulags in Siberia and the north of Russia, where many of them died. The Russian Germans who were mostly farmers and their critical view of the dekulakization connected with their rather strong rootedness in religion was one aspect that Stalin had an eye on them. Another aspect was the takeover of the Nazis in Germany. Here one can see that ethnicity constructs together with other group constructs (Kulaks) can dominate nearly every aspect of one's life.

*Table 5.3: Deportation of Russian Germans during the 30ies of the 20th Century.*³³

Year(s)	Number	From	To
1932-33	1.200 Families	Ukrainian SSR	Karelia
1935	8.300 Families	Wolhynia	Sibiria
1936	15.000 Personen	Ukrainia SSR	Kazach SSR

The people who were deported got the official status трудовые поселения (work settlers) and were not allowed to leave the region without special permission.

5.6. The Russian Germans and WWII

Immediately after the attack from Germany a mass deportation of Russian Germans began. The Wolgarepublic ceased to exist. Between 1941 and 1945 over 1,1 mio. Russian Germans were transported, mainly to so called „special residential areas“ in Siberia, the Altay Region and the north of Kazakhstan. They were not allowed to leave these territories. Around 300.000 people died during this deportation. From 1942 onwards every man between 17 and 50 and later on between 15 and 55 and women between 16 and 45 had to join the so called trudarmy (Трудовая армия), which meant forced labour. Those who were not deported and fell into the hands of the Wehrmacht had to move to the so called *Warthegau* where they were checked and categorized³⁴. This was to done to decide wheatear they were “real” Germans or not. Furthermore their

³² немцы россии энциклопедия том 1, ЭРН. Moskau 1999. p. 684

³³ Compare: немцы россии энциклопедия том 1, ЭРН. Moskau: 1999. p. 697.

³⁴ Source: http://www.russlanddeutschegeschichte.de/deutsch3/einstufung_rd.htm (looked after 1.2.2010)

political views were observed as well. The majority of these people were later deported to Siberia and Central Asia after the Red Army had conquered the Warthegau.

Whereas in the thirties of the twentieth century the markers religion, farmer and later ethnicity made the Russian Germans an out-group it was during WWII combining ethnic belonging from an essentialistic point of view with political concepts: German=Fascist=Enemy.

5.7. After WWII until 1990

In the late 1940's the Trudarmy was dissolved. The Russian Germans had to stay in their special areas until 1955. From December 1955³⁵ onwards they were allowed to travel freely with the exception of settling in the regions they were deported from. Before WWII the majority of the Russia Germans lived in the European part of the Soviet Union and after WWII in the Asian part. In 1964 the Russian Germans were partly rehabilitated. Already from 1985 onwards bigger groups of Russian Germans left Russia towards Germany. This was against the background of Perestroika and Glasnost'.

Table 5.4: No. of Russian Germans in USSR³⁶:

	1959	1970	1979	1989
RSFR	820.091	761.888	790.762	842.295
Kazachstan	658.698	858.077	900.207	957.518
Central Asia	94.108	165.835	183.988	178.223
Ukraine	23.243	29.871	34.139	37.849
Moldowa	3.843	9.399	11.374	7.335
Baltics	13.466	19.900	9.860	9.307
Belorus	k.A.	k.A.	2.451	3.517
Caucasus	k.A.	k.A.	3.434	3.869
Sum	1.619.655	1.846.317	1.936.214	2.038.603


5.8. Migration after the collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union was the starting point for a huge migration wave from former Soviet Republics to Germany. This chapter deals with the migration flows from Russia and other former SU countries to Germany and vice versa. It will try to show how external circumstances and changes on the structural level (eg. new laws) can influence migration processes.

³⁵ Указ от 13. декабря 1955. г. "О снятии ограничений в правовом положении с немцев и членов их семей, находящихся на спецпоселении" (Source Memorial: <http://www.memo.ru/history/nem/index.htm>)

³⁶ Compare: немцы россии энциклопедия том 1, ЭРН. Moskau: 1999. p. 689.


Chart 5.1: Number of Russian Germans who emigrated from former SU to Germany.³⁷ (German figures)



It can be seen at a first glance that the peak of immigration was in the middle of the 1990's, maintained a high stable level until 2001 then followed by a slight decrease until 2005 followed by a significant decrease in 2006. The immigration in the 90's can be seen against the background of the instable economic situation in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early years of the new millennium Russia was facing a massive economy boom until very recently so the declining numbers do not show a surprising picture. The most interesting change took place when one compares the years 2005 and 2006.

³⁷ Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Datenreport 2006, Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Auszug aus Teil 1 auf www.destatis.de looked after 12.12.2010

Chart 5.2: Emigration to Germany vs. immigration from Germany to Russia.³⁸ (Russian figures)



From 2002 onwards one can detect a clear downward movement of 14,2 % of emigration to Germany against the previous year but the most significant cutback can be seen if one compares the years 2005 and 2006. In the year 2006 the number of emigrants decreased by 62 %. Concerning the immigration to Russia a significant increase by 37 % from 2002 to 2003 can be seen. In the following years, according to official Russian statistics, around 3.000 people came from Germany to settle in Russia. These figures do not clearly show if these people are Russian Germans. If one compares the official russian data with the data concerning Russian Germans provided by Bund der Vertriebenen³⁹ the mean deviation is 11 %. But what can be clearly said is that in both statistics a significant cutback from emigration towards Germany can be detected.

If one has a look at the external conditions when asking why the number of Russian Germans who migrated to Germany decreased, it has to be said first that the main part already left Russia during the nineties. But if one looks at the changes from 2005 to 2006 one has to ask which additional factors played a role explaining this decrease. Here the official politics from both German and Russian side could play a significant role.

³⁸ Source: 1997-2007: www.gks.ru; 2008: www.demographia.ru

³⁹ Compare: <http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/infopool/spaetauss1.php3>

5.9. Official Politics

Germany

Russian Germans are a special group of migrants in Germany. This is due to the fact that Russian Germans are Germans by law, which is very close to the ideal type of *jus sanguinis* (the right of blood):

Deutscher Volkszugehöriger im Sinne dieses Gesetzes ist, wer sich in seiner Heimat zum deutschen Volkstum bekannt hat, sofern dieses Bekenntnis durch bestimmte Merkmale wie Abstammung, Sprache, Erziehung, Kultur bestätigt wird.⁴⁰

This law stresses markers like culture and descent. Furthermore, Germany not only grants citizenship by giving out passports. The law (Bundesvertriebengesetz) explicitly deals with integration and incorporation as well. So shall ethnic German repatriates have eased access to the vocational, cultural and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴¹ But in 2005 the German State tightened the conditions under which late German repatriates are allowed to settle permanently in Germany. These changes affect mainly the relatives of a Russian German. One of the measures is that partners have to be married for at least three years and to prove that they have knowledge of the German language. All new measures can be seen as a clear obstacle that makes it more difficult for family members to settle in Germany. This can be seen as an indirect measure of exclusion of Russian Germans and their relatives from the German welfare system.

On the other side, Germany, meaning here the ministry for inner affairs, supports Russian Germans in their countries of origin (e.g. Russia). These measures can be seen as a strategy to keep Russian Germans outside Germany in order to avoid further integration problems. So Germany follows inclusion and exclusion strategies the same time.

⁴⁰ Bundesvertriebenengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 10. August 2007 (BGBl. I p. 1902), geändert durch Artikel 19 Abs. 1 des Gesetzes vom 12. Dezember 2007 (BGBl. I p. 2840) http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:OvIUVMwO_toJ:bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bvfg/gesamt.pdf+bundesvertriebenengesetz&cd=2&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=de looked after 17.3.2009

⁴¹ Compare: http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bvfg/___7.html, looked after 12.3.2009

Russia

In Russia the ministry that focuses on minorities and hereby amongst many others with Russian Germans⁴² is the ministry of Regional Development. Amongst other things it is in charge of:

the nationalities policy and ethnic relations in Russia, as well as the protection of rights of ethnic minorities and small indigenous groups⁴³

Under the guideline of this ministry a program to bring Russian citizens who had emigrated back to Russia was developed:

Государственная программа по оказанию содействия добровольному переселению в Российскую Федерацию соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом⁴⁴.

This program was developed to help Russians abroad, especially those residing in Russia's near abroad but also in other countries and Russian Germans amongst them, to resettle in Russia with the goal to improve Russia's socio-economic and demographic structures in many regions of the country. In addition to this the Russian Embassy in Berlin has placed a link to an organization that calls itself Remigrant that declares it itself as

“an internet portal providing information for Russians living outside the Russian Federation, especially those in Germany who would like to live and work in their motherland Russia.”⁴⁵

These goals were at least formulated against the background of an increasingly booming economy before the crisis 2009. So contrary to Germany, which follows a double strategy of inclusion and exclusion, Russia seems to want Russian Germans back in Russia.

5.10. Conclusion

In conclusion one can say that measures from both sides seem to have an impact on the migration flows of Russian Germans and both seem to result in the same way: The tendency that Russia seems again to be an option for permanent settlement for Russian Germans. This tendency is still a very small one but one can at least say that these

⁴² The author of the study is well aware of the fact that Russian Germans who have an approx. share of 0.41 % on the total population of the RF (compare: www.demographia.ru; figures from census 2002) are not the target group no. 1 for this program, but still fall into the parameters of the program.

⁴³ <http://www.government.ru/eng/power/57/>

⁴⁴ http://www.minregion.ru/state_programs/

⁴⁵ Compare: <http://www.remigrant.de/content/blogsection/8/44/>

measures have slowed the process of emigration from Russia down and there is even immigration from Germany to Russia. The migration flows show furthermore that Germany is not just the receiving country and Russia the sending country, as it was believed for many years. The figures shown above lead to the hypothesis that the frameworks provided by both countries lead at least partly to transnational flows of migration. This means that migration is not necessarily one way nor can it be seen as something that has a clear end.

6. The situation in Germany

6.1. The perception of ethnic German Repatriates in the Federal Republic of Germany. Descriptive Analysis

As already stated above, identity is also about the perception by others. So how do people in Germany see ethnic German repatriates? In other words is there a boundary between Germans and Russian Germans? The German General Social Survey, which is a biennial survey where a representative cross-section of the population is asked using face-to-face interviews, provides data which can be used to analyze how the ethnic German repatriates are seen by the population. The main questions are:

- Are there perceived differences in terms of “we” and “they, or do they belong to the same social category for them
- How positive, neutral or negative is the attitude of the respondents towards ethnic German repatriates

Therefore the following questions, which in this analysis will serve as indicators are asked:⁴⁶

1. Concerning influx into Germany:
 - The influx should be possible without limitations
 - The influx should be possible with limitations
 - The influx should be prohibited
 - Do not know
2. Concerning the difference in life style between Germans and ethnic German repatriates:

How strongly do ethnic Germans coming from Eastern Europe living in Germany differ from the rest of the German population? Answering options provided range from 1 not at all to 7 very strong.

⁴⁶ The questions are taken out off the ALLBUS survey 2006. Source: <http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/allbus/fragebogen/za4500fb1.pdf>

3. Concerning ethnic German repatriates as neighbors:

How pleasant or unpleasant would an ethnic German repatriate be as neighbor for you? Answering options provided range from -3 very unpleasant for me to +3 would be very pleasant for me.

4. Concerning marry-in of an ethnic German repatriate into one's family

How pleasant or unpleasant would a marry-in of a Russian German into your family be for you? Answering options provided range from -3 very unpleasant for me to +3 would be very pleasant for me.


5. Equality under law

The ethnic German repatriates living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans in every aspect of their life. Answering options provided range from 1, do not agree at all, to 7, strongly agree.

These questions were chosen to observe the acceptance and the perception of ethnic Germans by the domestic population in Germany.

Ad 1: The influx into Germany

Chart 6.1: Influx into Germany:⁴⁷



N= 3.358

Chart 6.1 shows that the vast majority of the respondents (74.5 %) are for limitations concerning the influx of ethnic German Repatriates into Germany. 14.1 % are for

⁴⁷ Data: ALLBUS 2006. Data Source: Leibniz Institute for the social sciences (www.gesis.org)

unlimited influx where 11.4 % respond that there should be no more influx by ethnic German repatriates at all. This first glance at the figures can be seen as an indication that ethnic Germans Repatriates are perceived by many people as different. Before dealing with the difference between ethnic German Repatriates and the “normal” German population it will be observed if there are differences in age groups, sex and education concerning the attitude towards question 1. Where men and women do not differ significantly in answering the question concerning the influx there is a difference between age groups:

Table 6.1: Age groups vs. influx

	18-29 Years	30-44 Years	45-59 Years	60-74 Years	Above 74 Years
Unlimited	19,5 %	14,6 %	13,0 %	11,9 %	12,2 %
Limited	72,1 %	74,8 %	74,4 %	75,4 %	74,8 %
Prohibition	8,4 %	10,6 %	12,6 %	12,7 %	13,0 %

N= 3.351 Chi Square: 22,47 df: 8 (significant at 0,05 Level)

Table 6.1 shows that the youngest cohort differs slightly but significantly from all other age groups. Although in this cohort the majority is for limited access as well it contains the highest percentage of respondents who favor unlimited influx: 19.5 % compared to 14.1 % overall and the lowest of those who are in favor of prohibition of influx: 8.4 % compared to 11.4 % overall. Also a difference in responding can be detected if one looks at education:

Table 6.2: Education I vs. influx

	No certificate	Primary - or secondary school	O-levels	Advanced college entrance qualification	Qualification for university entrance	Still at school
Unlimited	21,1 %	10,6 %	13,1 %	13,1 %	21,7 %	23,3 %
Limited	61,4 %	73,0 %	76,3 %	77,6 %	74,9 %	73,3 %
Prohibition	17,5 %	16,4 %	10,6 %	9,3 %	3,4 %	3,3 %

N= 3.344 Qui Square: 115,12 df: 10 (significant at 0.05 level)

As table 6.2 shows the higher the respondent’s education the smaller the likelihood that she or he belongs to the group that is for strict prohibition of influx of ethnic German repatriates. The converse argument that the higher the education the more likely a response in favor of unlimited influx into Germany is only partly true, if one takes into account that the relative share of respondents within the group without any school leaving certificate who are in favor of unlimited influx (21,1 %) nearly equals the group with qualification for entering university. But the very same group, namely the one

without school leaving certificate, is the group with the highest relative share of people against influx of ethnic German repatriates (17.5 %). As a next step it shall be observed if there are differences in attitude whether one holds a university degree or not:


Table 6.3: University degree or not vs. attitude towards influx

	no degree	Degree
Unlimited	13,3 %	21,1 %
Limited	74,4 %	75,9 %
Prohibit	12,4 %	3,1 %
N=3.318; Qui Square: 34.55 df:2 (significant at 0.05 level)		

As table 6.3 clearly shows, people with a university degree are more likely to be tolerant about the influx of ethnic German Repatriates.

Ad 2: The difference in lifestyle between ethnic German repatriates and Germans

Chart 6.1: How strongly do ethnic Germans coming from Eastern Europe living in Germany differ from the rest of the German population? (On a scale from 1= not at all to seven= very strongly)



N= 3.215

As already assumed above, ethnic German Repatriates are perceived as something different. The data shown in chart 8.1 points in the same direction. Only 3.5 % of the respondents state that there is no difference between ethnic German repatriates and the rest of the German population at all. The question that arises now is if this difference is accompanied by positive, negative or neutral attitudes towards ethnic German repatriates. Before this question will be answered, it shall be observed if there are

differences in answering the question about different lifestyle between males and females, different age groups and different levels of education. If one crosstabs sex with difference in style of life one can see a very tiny but not significant difference between male and female respondents. When it comes to age groups the situation is the following:

	18-29 Years	30-44 Years	45-59 Years	60-74 Years	over 74 Years
not at all	5,9%	2,5%	3,7%	2,5%	4,5%
2	12,0%	10,5%	8,5%	8,6%	9,5%
3	19,3%	15,2%	14,9%	14,3%	14,5%
4	23,6%	22,6%	21,8%	20,3%	23,2%
5	23,6%	28,1%	24,0%	24,8%	22,3%
6	11,6%	12,9%	18,1%	17,3%	15,0%
very strongly	4,1%	8,2%	9,0%	12,2%	10,9%
N= 3.208					

If one compares the age groups and their response style it can be detected that the group of 18-29 year olds is the one that slightly tends to see the ethnic German repatriates less differently in terms of lifestyle than the other age groups. More generally speaking, it seems that there is a slight tendency that the older one is the higher the chance that she or he sees bigger differences in style of life regarding ethnic German repatriates and the rest of the German population (Spearman: 0.1; $p < 0,01$; N= 3.208). The comparison between different levels of education shows the following picture:


Table 6.4: Education vs. life style

	Primary - or secondary school	O-levels	Advanced college entrance qualification	Qualification for university entrance	Still at school
not at all	4,3%	2,4%	5,7%	2,3%	6,7%
2	8,5%	10,1%	11,9%	10,1%	20,0%
3	14,7%	13,6%	17,0%	19,3%	20,0%
4	20,9%	22,9%	19,9%	24,0%	16,7%
5	23,8%	26,3%	22,2%	26,1%	30,0%
6	16,5%	15,7%	17,6%	12,4%	6,7%
very strongly	11,2%	9,1%	5,7%	5,8%	0,0%
N= 3.159; Chi Square= 59.3 df: 24 ((significant at 0.05 level)					

The higher the educational level of the respondents the less salient the perception of differences in style of live are respondent. If one takes university degrees into account it has to be said that people holding a university degree tend to see less salient

differences in lifestyle than people without a university degree, but this difference is only marginal ($\Phi = 0.07$; $p < 0.05$).

Chart 6.2: ethnic German repatriates as neighbours



If asked the question: How pleasant or unpleasant would an ethnic German Repatriate be as neighbour for you, the biggest group (38,8 %) answers neutrally, meaning neither pleasant nor unpleasant. The smallest group is the one that answers with very unpleasant (5,6 %) where 8.1 % answer that it would be very pleasant for them to have an ethnic German repatriate as neighbour. Male and female respondents do not differ significantly when answering this question. A different picture shows the answering style of different age groups:

Table 6.5: Age groups vs. ethnic German repatriate as neighbour

	18-29 Years	30-44 Years	45-59 Years	60-74 Years	over 74 Years
very unpleasant	3,3%	4,8%	5,5%	6,6%	9,9%
-2	6,9%	7,1%	9,2%	10,9%	9,5%
-1	12,7%	12,2%	12,9%	13,4%	10,7%
0	37,3%	40,9%	38,8%	37,6%	36,8%
1	16,3%	15,5%	15,2%	15,7%	16,1%
2	13,3%	10,8%	10,1%	9,0%	11,2%
very pleasant	10,2%	8,7%	8,2%	6,6%	5,8%
N= 3.360; Qui Square: 40.7 df: 24 (significant at 0.05 level)					

It seems that the 18-29 year olds tend to have a more positive attitude towards ethnic German Repatriates as neighbours. Generally one can say that age seems to have a small but significant influence: The younger the respondent the more likely a positive

attitude towards ethnic German repatriates as neighbours (Spearman: -0.1; $p < 0.01$; $N = 3.360$)

Also differences can be detected when one looks at how people with different levels of education respond:

Table 6.6: Education vs. ethnic German repatriate as neighbour


	Primary - or secondary school	O-levels	Advanced college entrance qualification	Qualification for university entrance	Still at school
very unpleasant	7,5%	4,4%	6,0%	4,0%	3,3%
-2	11,7%	8,2%	7,1%	5,2%	0,0%
-1	13,1%	12,5%	13,6%	12,0%	16,7%
0	36,8%	41,1%	39,7%	38,1%	40,0%
1	15,1%	15,4%	11,4%	18,4%	13,3%
2	8,5%	10,8%	14,1%	12,8%	10,0%
very pleasant	7,3%	7,6%	8,2%	9,6%	16,7%

N= 3.295; Chi Square: 66.3 df: 24 (significant at 0.05 level)

Although there are no big differences between the groups, it can be said that a higher degree of formal school education tends to result in a more positive attitude towards ethnic German repatriates as neighbours.

Ad 4: Marry-in of an ethnic German repatriate into one's family

Chart 8.3: Marry-in of an ethnic German into one's family



To the question how the respondents would see a marry-in of an ethnic German repatriate into one's family the biggest group (39.3 %) is the one that answers neutrally.

What can be seen as well is that the number of people who are more likely to see a marry-in unpleasantly exceed the number of those who see it more positively (-1, -2, very unpleasant: 32.8 % vs. 1, 2, very pleasant: 27.8 %). A test about differences between males and females showed that no differences can be detected.

Table 6.7: Age groups vs. in marriage

	18-29 Years	30-44 Years	45-59 Years	60-74 Years	over 74 Years
Very unpleasant	6,9%	8,1%	9,7%	11,7%	14,2%
-2	6,1%	7,8%	10,1%	13,6%	12,9%
-1	12,5%	13,2%	13,5%	15,0%	10,4%
0	42,0%	40,3%	38,6%	36,8%	41,3%
1	11,8%	12,9%	11,9%	11,4%	10,0%
2	10,0%	9,4%	8,3%	6,0%	5,0%
Very pleasant	10,8%	8,3%	7,9%	5,6%	6,3%
N= 3.334; Qui Square: 69.9 df: 24 (significant at 0.05 level)					

As table 6.7 shows clearly, the group of 18-29 year olds tends to have the least problems with a marry-in of an ethnic German repatriate. In general one can say that the younger the respondent the more likely to answer in a positive way to the question about the in-marriage of an ethnic German repatriate into the family (Spearman: -0,13; $p < 0.01$; N= 3.334)


Table 6.8: Education vs. in marriage

	Primary - or general education secondary school	O-levels	Advanced college entrance qualification	Qualification for university entrance	Still at school
very unpleasant	13,6%	8,6%	6,0%	4,0%	6,7%
-2	13,3%	9,3%	7,7%	5,1%	3,3%
-1	14,5%	13,6%	10,4%	12,4%	6,7%
0	35,2%	40,9%	45,1%	43,9%	36,7%
1	10,3%	12,9%	11,0%	13,8%	10,0%
2	5,8%	8,2%	12,1%	10,4%	23,3%
very pleasant	7,4%	6,5%	7,7%	10,3%	13,3%
N= 3.271; Qui Square: 133.2 df: 24 (significant at 0.05 level)					

Higher education goes hand in hand with a tendency to perceive an in-marriage of an ethnic German repatriate into one's family as rather pleasant. Furthermore people with a university degree tend answer more positively than people without a university degree (Spearman: 0.1; $p < 0.01$; N= 3.302)

Ad 5: Equality under law

Chart 6.5: For equality under law



The biggest group of respondents is the one that is in favour of treating ethnic German repatriates equally before the law. The interesting fact is here that ethnic German repatriates are German citizens by constitutional law (Grundgesetz), which means that every German repatriate has the right to settle in Germany and the right to claim a German passport.

Table 6.9: Equality before the law vs. Education

	Primary - or general education secondary school	O-levels	Advanced college entrance qualification	Qualification for university entrance	Still at school
do not agree	12,0%	9,6%	8,3%	4,1%	0,0%
2	9,0%	8,2%	10,6%	6,6%	6,9%
3	12,1%	11,2%	13,9%	10,8%	3,4%
4	21,2%	19,0%	20,6%	14,2%	6,9%
5	12,9%	13,7%	8,9%	11,8%	13,8%
6	8,9%	13,0%	10,0%	12,7%	34,5%
strongly agree	23,8%	25,4%	27,8%	39,8%	34,5%

N= 3.264; Chi Square: 124.8 df: 24 (significant at 0.05 level)

The higher a person is formally educated the greater the chance that he or she is for treating ethnic German repatriates equally under the law in every aspect of their life.

6.2. Conclusion

As a first conclusion it can be said that the indicators chosen for demonstrating how the respondents perceive the ethnic German repatriates show that the majority has a merely neutral attitude towards them. Whereas gender does not seem to have an influence on that perception, education and age do play a role:

- The younger people are, the more positive their attitude towards ethnic German repatriates
- The better their formal education, the more positive their attitude towards ethnic German repatriates

As a conclusion in terms of Identity, one can argue that amongst the universe of identification offers and the less people are formally educated and the older they are the chance rises that there is stricter limitations for what can be described as their concept of being German.

The question that follows is if the fact that one perceives ethnic German repatriates as different has an impact on their attitude towards them. Therefore the following hypotheses was formulated:

The bigger the perception of difference of lifestyle the more negative the attitude towards ethnic German repatriates.

For testing this the following variables were chosen: Difference in Lifestyle was chosen to show the perceived difference and the variables: in-marriage, neighbour, equality under law and influx where chosen as attitude indicators:

Table 6.10: Correlations between:

Perceived Difference in Style of Life	
Influx	0.2
Neighbour	-0.3
In Marriage	-0.3
Equality under Law	-0.25

Correlation after Spearman highly significant

These coefficients presented in table 6.10 show a clear picture. There is a tendency that if one perceives differences in lifestyle between the in-group “ordinary Germans” and the out-group “ethnic German repatriates” the possibility of having a negative attitude towards the out-group rises. As a further conclusion it can be said that in this context the

differences are not seen as neutral but as a ranking: the favoured and positive connotated in-group vs. the negative connotated out-group. This does not mean that everybody who sees differences in lifestyle has a negative attitude towards the Russian Germans but the likelihood rises.

Summing up one can say that there can indeed differences between Germans and Russian Germans as seen by Germans be detected. It seems that the limitations of “sharing criteria for evaluation and judgement” apply to a large extent to the case of the Russian Germans in Germany.

7. The general Situation in Russia

The Russian majority of today does not seem to have a specific attitude towards Russian Germans. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that the author was not able to find any surveys that dealt with attitudes of Russians or Russian citizens towards Russian Germans. Second, when screening the Russian media (newspapers, TV, internet...) it can be clearly said that Russian Germans are not a major topic if a topic at all. Surveys which are dealing with minorities in general do not provide a special field or box that says “Russian Germans” or “ethnic Germans” etc. and if the question concerning minorities or *nationalnost*⁴⁸ is an open one it is mainly people from the Caucasus and Central Asia that are seen as minorities, mostly with negative connotations.⁴⁸

This is not a surprising picture as Russia faces various difficulties in the Caucasus region and more generally what is called Russia’s ‘near abroad’ or Russia’s self-declared ‘zone of influence’. The Russian Germans are simply just not on today’s agenda. But how quickly contexts and circumstances can change was already shown above in the chapter historical overview.

7.1. The Situation in Russia compared to the Situation in Germany

In Germany, the fact that a high number of Russian Germans migrated from the CIS to Germany after the collapse of the Soviet-Union can be seen as a strong indicator of why Russian Germans experience attention on part of the German public. This, on the other side, can serve as an argument why there is less attention on the part of the Russian

⁴⁸ Compare: www.fom.ru

public. The Russian Germans were a small minority before the collapse of the Soviet Union and are becoming since then an ever smaller one. A further explanation why Russian Germans are not on the agenda in Russia can be seen against the background of the tense situation in the Caucasus region, the big influx of “Gastarbeiter” from Central Asia and the construction of how people see them. In this sense, Russian Germans are not a visible minority in today’s Russia. These different perceptions of Russian Germans in two different countries can be seen as a strong indicator when arguing that perceived differences must be seen as the present day result of ongoing social and historical processes.

8. Organizations

Whereas Glick Schiller sees transborder citizens as “*people who live their live across the borders of two or more nation states*”⁴⁹ this also can be said for various organizations in the case of the Russian Germans which operate across the borders of Germany and Russia.

8.1. In Russia

Amongst many organizations which deal with Russian Germans, the German Russian houses (Deutsch Russische Häuser) all over Russia can be seen as the most important ones. Altogether there are 300 of these meeting centers.

The main questions concerning these houses are: What are their goals? What do they do? The question behind these two questions are, why do these houses exist and who stands behind these houses. As an example for these German Russian houses one can take the German Russian meeting centre at the Petri church in St.Petersburg. (Deutsch Russisches Begegnungszentrum an der Petrikirche St.Petersburg), which is a foundation that was established 1991.

What are their goals

According to the foundation itself their goals are:⁵⁰

The preservation of the Russian German cultural heritage in Russia. This means more concretely their language and their traditions. Furthermore they want to encourage all

⁴⁹ Nina Glick Schiller, "Transborder Citizenship: an Outcome of Legal Pluralism within Transnational Social Fields" (February 15, 2005). *Department of Sociology, UCLA. Theory and Research in Comparative Social Analysis*. Paper 25.

⁵⁰ Compare: www.drb.ru

Russians to learn the German language. German traditions are here mainly Christian festivals following the catholic and protestant church calendar and hereby mainly Christmas, Easter and the Harvest festival, as well as carnival that has its roots in religion but became a secular event.

What do they do

The Foundation offers and coordinates a wide range of activities that focus on Russian Germans: Their main tasks are:⁵¹

- German language courses for adults and children
- Working groups for people who learn German
- Folklore- and theater groups for children and adults
- Exchange programs for young people Helping to find Russian German ancestors in Russia
- Excursions to Russia and Germany
- Concerts in the Petrikirche
- Traditional German festivals

As seen on the exchange programs, although their main task is to operate in Russia for their local Russian German community, the organization has also an, at least partly, transnational agenda. They are also one of Germany's official cultural mediators which is most obvious during the "German week"⁵² which takes place once a year in St. Petersburg.

Why do these houses exist

These houses exist upon the initiative of the German State through the German Ministry for Inner Affairs. This is due to the fact that Russian Germans are Germans under constitutional law (Grundgesetz, please compare chapter: *Who is a Russian German*). The current reason why these meeting centers actually exist can be stated as follows: To keep the Russian Germans happy in Russia so that they do not move to Germany. Behind all this stands the massive flow of Russian Germans and their dependents to Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was followed by integration problems. The fact that the Russian Germans could easily swap into the political subsystem of Germany meaning here gaining granted citizenship did not go hand in

⁵¹ Compare: www.rusdeutsch.ru

⁵² <http://www.deutsche-woche.ru/2009/layout.php?sp=0>

hand with other subsystems. Most salient here is the subsystem economy. This has roots in the fact that it was very hard if not impossible for most people to find a job according to their education. This was not only a problem of lacking language knowledge but of not officially recognizing their diplomas which they gained in the former Soviet Union or its successor states. So it seems the German state was facing a dilemma. It could not just ignore these people because they were and are still entitled to be German citizens on the one hand but on the other hand these people are partly seen as a threat concerning welfare costs. Therefore it seems these centers were established to serve as an instrument that shall enforce a positive identity of Russian Germans in Russia. This is part of a program operated by GTZ and that was developed to “*provide the German minority with an alternative to repatriating to the Federal Republic of Germany*”.⁵³ One of the most prominent indicators for this is the program “Avantgarde”⁵⁴. This is a program by the Ministry of Inner Affairs of Germany to promote German minorities in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Other programs were establishing and forming a network between the Russian German houses or meeting centers themselves, language work, youth work and social work.⁵⁵ The aim behind the “Avantgarde” program is to form a new elite within the Russian German Community in Russia and CIS countries that stays in these countries. The goal behind this is to provide Russian Germans with identification figures amongst them. This already relates to the question of who stands behind the German Russian meeting centers: As the main actor, as already stated, one can make out the German state. On the operational side the most important organization that has to be mentioned is the GTZ which is, according to their homepage, working “worldwide in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development”⁵⁶

8.2. In Germany

As the most prominent organization the “Landmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland” (LDR), which could be translated as “association of fellow countrymen or compatriots of Germans from Russia” has to be named. This organization understands itself as THE group that represents lobbies for ALL RUSSIAN GERMANS

⁵³ Compare: <http://www.gtz.de/de/weltweit/europa-kaucasus-zentralasien/regionale-themen/4293.htm>

⁵⁴ Compare: <http://www.rusdeutsch.eu/?menu=15&level2=&z=1>

⁵⁵ Compare: http://www.drh-moskau.ru/?page=pr_begegnungsstaeten&lang=de

⁵⁶ Compare: <http://www.gtz.de/en/689.htm>

WORLDWIDE.⁵⁷ That this statement does not necessarily count for the Russian Germans from South America is indicated in an email from a representative personally sent to the author of this study:

“[...] 2) We are in contact with the AHS [...] but we do not have a person devoted to keep the relationship with them fluently. We know there is an association of Germans from Russia in Germany, but our efforts to contact them have been useless so far.”⁵⁸

Nevertheless this organization operates at the federal level in Germany and there are about 200 local associations all over Germany.

Their goals

As already stated the LDR perceives itself as the central organization for all Russian Germans worldwide. But their goals are focusing mainly on Germany and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Whereas in Germany they are more concerned about integration their aim is to fight for special minority rights of the Russian Germans in Russia and other former SU countries. In the Russian case this fight for special minority rights must be seen against the background of the history of the Russian Germans under the Stalin regime and WWII where Russian Germans were marked as fascists and therefore inner enemies with far reaching consequences (Trudarmy, forced settlement...; compare chapter *Historical overview*). In Germany their goals are frameworks that make it easier for Russian Germans to migrate to Germany and to integrate into the German society.

What do they do

Their main activities can be described as integration work. This already starts with consulting offices especially for Russian German migrants which were created for people who have newly arrived in Germany. Nearly all of their programs contain the word *integration* in their headlines. These programs officially bring Russian Germans and Germans together in order to reduce stereotypes towards Russian Germans. Although many projects are planned as integration projects one can see that the aim of the LDR does not go so far as to have assimilation as their final goal. It seems that their goal is that Russian Germans shall still perceive themselves as a special group and Russian Germans shall remain as a reference group. This can be seen in such things as

⁵⁷ <http://www.deutscheausrussland.de/ziele.htm>

⁵⁸ Taken from an eMail on Feb. 15th 2010

an own newspaper, exhibitions, books, cultural events and youth organizations all under the patronage of the LDR.

Who stands behind

Although the constitution of the LDR says that it is an organization above confessional and party lines, it is interesting to see that the head of its joint board is a politician. Furthermore, throughout the joint board⁵⁹ politicians mainly from CDU and CSU which are the conservative Parties in Germany can be detected. The interlinkage between conservative Parties and Russian Germans on a macro-level is also indicated by the fact that the former official delegate for ethnic German repatriates Dr. Waffenschmidt⁶⁰, a conservative politician, was called “father of all Russian Germans”. It seems that this organization tries to instrumentalize the Russian Germans by trying to become a catch-all organization and to define what it means being a Russian German. This goes many ways. On the one side this organization attracts conservative politicians because of its clear forward statements concerning traditions and culture, with a potential of over 2 million potential voters and on the other hand the struggle for influence with 2.4 million potential members as background from the side of the LDR. This can be seen as a bargaining process on a very high level concerning access to power. Therefore the LDR needs to be the most important player, at least in the perception of the political side. This makes it necessary for the LDR to try to become the organization that defines being Russian German and this also can be seen as one of the driving forces why, apart from integration programs, programs that are focusing on the youth exist.

Maybe the LDR can be described as an organization that perceives itself as some kind of elite of a “mental federal state” within the German Republic with some colonies in former SU countries.

8.3. Conclusion

Comparing both organizations, it is obvious that they have much in common and are interlinked in many ways. Both have a clear transnational agenda. That means that their sphere of operations does not end at national borders. They both act and have relationships to other (amongst each other) organizations mostly in Germany and Russia and other former SU Countries. Another reason why one can call them transnational

⁵⁹ <http://www.deutscheausrussland.de/vorstand.htm>

⁶⁰ www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8608165.html


organizations and not global is that they clearly have nation states in focus: The aim in Germany is to integrate Russian Germans and to work for a positive group consciousness and in Russia to stress the belonging to the special group of the Russian Germans but being Russian citizens.

9. The self-perception

Is there a sense of belonging of the Russian Germans to the in-group of the Russian Germans? Is the group of the Russian Germans a reference group for them? And if so, what does it mean for them being a Russian German? After having a look at the macro level, meaning the structures in which the Russian Germans are embedded in Russia and in Germany, and the meso level, meaning which organizations stand between the actual Russian Germans and the macro level, the Russian and the German state, on the example of the German Russian meeting centers in Russia and the Landsmannschaft der Russlanddeutschen in Germany, one of the central questions is how the Russian Germans perceive themselves. This question was the basis for creating a survey, which was based on qualitative in-depth interviews, literature- and online-research as well as previous research concerning Russian Germans.

The most important question was: How do you see yourself? I regard myself firstly and the most...

Chart 9.1: Self-perception



N=180


The biggest group, which makes up nearly half of all respondents (48.9 %), sees itself as Russian German, 20 % answer Something else, followed by 18.3 % German and 12.8 % Russian. The fact that more than two thirds of the respondents neither see themselves as firstly Russians nor as firstly Germans indicates that there is strong sense of a perceived boundary between the out-group here, either Germans or Russians and the Russian Germans. But the fact that a fifth see themselves as something else indicates that being a Russian German as seen from outside does not necessarily mean although ascribed as one that it automatically creates a sense of belonging meaning identifying oneself as Russian German. The question others was an open one, so the respondents had the possibility to state themselves how they regard themselves. The answers were ranging from what can be categorized as a World citizen to being both Russian and German which does not mean being Russian German. Therefore one can conclude so far that something else does not necessarily mean that one can speak here of a homeogenous group. What also can be drawn from this first question is that it seems that one has to have a closer look at the context and what it means to be Russian German.

9.1. The context

In the chapters *Situation in Germany* and *General situation in Russia* the conclusion was drawn that there is strong evidence that identity formation processes are dependant on different contexts, but this could only be said for the question how the respective out-group perceived them so far. The question here is if the context plays an important role for themselves in terms of self-description and self definition.

If one has a look at the literature about research on Russian Germans, the media and the discourses, one can make out one sentence that goes through all this like a red line: “*In Germany I am a Russian and in Russia I am a German.*”

Chart 9.2: In Germany Russian/ In Russia German




N= 173

Chart 9.2 clearly shows that the context plays an outstanding role when talking about in-groups and out-groups or in this case: How the Russian Germans perceive themselves in different countries. This is already a clear indicator for the thesis that identity is nothing stable and strongly dependant on the circumstances. Nevertheless it has to be closely observed how Russian Germans see Russian Germans in regards to belonging to either Germany or Russia, Germany and Russia, neither Germany nor Russia. Or does neither of these concepts play a role in the self-understanding of the Russian Germans. To test this, the respondents were asked how strongly they agree/ disagree with following sentences:

1. Russian Germans are both Russians and Germans

Chart 9.3: Both




N=167

The answers provided show a slight tendency towards both. So one can speak partly of tendencies towards hybridity meaning instead of relying on just one concept of belonging having both, this was already indicated when the majority answered to the context question, but interestingly the fact that the otherness in regards to the main society is stressed out. Before going into detail one should have a closer look at the reactions to the opposite statement: Russian Germans are neither Russians nor Germans.

2. Russian Germans are neither Russians nor Germans

Chart 9.4: Neither/ Nor



N=161

Facing this picture, the assumption that at least a majority of Russian Germans perceive themselves as cultural hybrids becomes even more evident. If one interlinks these two variables one can clearly (unsurprisingly) see that people tend to prefer either one or the other option (correlation after Spearman: -0.45; highly significant). Therefore one can speak about two ideal types that mark the ends of a wide range of identification offers or possibilities concerning Russian Germans:


- The Hybrid
- The Separate

Both concepts do not explain anything concerning attitudes towards being Russian German, German or Russian. They just indicate that being different can mean different things. On the one hand it can mean a plus - stressing here both - on the other hand it can mean - different to both - being something completely different as a third option. But what both ideal types have in common is that they are different from being “pure” German or Russian. What has to be said as well is that the larger part of the respondents are more likely to perceive being Russian German as being both Russian and German than to be neither nor. So far the topic was if the respondents perceive themselves as Russian Germans or not, but that leads to the question of what it needs to be a Russian German.

Therefore for they were provided with sentences and asked to agree or disagree with them


1. To be a real Russian German one has to speak the German language
2. To be a real Russian German one has to avow oneself to the German culture.

Chart 9.5: Language, culture



Although most respondents agree that both language and culture are essential parts of being a Russian German, it is interesting to see that that the German language seems to be more important than culture. But one cannot see these two aspects as strictly separated ones, they are interlinked (Correlation after Spearman: 0.5; highly significant) which means that people who believe that one has to speak the German language also tend to believe that one has to avow oneself to the German culture in order to be a “real” Russian German. As a further step it is interesting to know how proud the Russian Germans are of Russia, Germany and of the circumstance being Russian German.

Chart 9.6: Proud of...



Russia: N=162; Germany: N=164; Being Russian German: N=165

What can be clearly seen is that being Russian German is for most people something they are proud of. So, one can say that the concept Russian German has in general a positive connotation for this group. Second comes Germany, where also the biggest group is the one that is proud of it. In the Russian case the biggest group can be described as neutral but still the ones who are proud of Russia exceed the ones who do not agree to the sentence “I am proud of Russia”. The interesting question that derives from that is how these variables are interlinked. Are we, when talking about being proud of these concepts, talking about three different attitudes that do not correspond at all? In other words do these feelings of belonging for which being proud of Russia, Germany or being Russian German each stand for exclude the other in each case? The alternative hypothesis to this would be that being proud of Russia, being proud of Germany and being proud of being a Russian German are complementary. When testing this hypothesis one sees that most evidence speaks for the second hypothesis:

Table 9.1: Proud of...


Russian German vs. Russia	0.3
Russian German vs. Germany	0.3
Russia vs. Germany	0.5

(Correlation after Spearman; highly significant)

The fact that the correlation between Russian German and Russia as well as Russian German and Germany is weaker than between Russia and Germany combined with the fact that the respondents in general tend to be more proud of being Russian German than of Germany or Russia indicates that being Russian German in this context is the most prominent concept of how they perceive themselves. Nevertheless one cannot say that these concepts are discrete concepts. They are all interlinked. This leads to the assumption that the Russian Germans tend to have the potential to combine both as stated above: Russian and German but stress being Russian German as most salient concept in this context. When asking about how attached the respondents feel to the Russian and the German culture, the results point in the same direction:

9.2. The cultural aspect

Chart 9.7: How attached do you feel to the...



Russian Culture: N=165; German Culture: N=171

The graph shows that both attachment to the German and the Russian culture are concepts that have not only the potential that Russian Germans feel attached to them, but also in the current situation both seem to provide enough identification offers for Russian Germans so that they feel attached to them on a large scale. And it is again much more likely that both go together (Correlation after Pearson: 0.6; highly significant) than excluding each other in terms of exclusion. Although all concepts so far cannot be seen as separate concepts that have nothing in common with the others, one still has to look at which possible forms of in-group formation can be detected in today's situation. Therefore a factor analysis was made with the following variables:

- How strongly do you feel attached to the Community of the Russian Germans?
- How strongly do you feel attached to the Russian Culture?
- How strongly do you feel attached to the German Culture?
- I am proud of being a Russian German
- I am proud of Russia
- I am proud of Germany
- How strongly do you feel attached to Russia?
- How strongly do you feel attached to Germany?

Table 9.2: Factor analysis

	Factor		
	1	2	3
The community of Russian Germans	,453		,706
German culture	,422	,668	
Russian culture	,588	-,539	
Proud being Russian German	,579		,594
Proud of Germany	,607	,525	
Proud of Russia	,776		
Attached to Russia	,637	-,548	
Attached to Germany		,729	

Rotation=Varimax; KMO=0.63

The current situation can be described as a picture where three concepts of self-perception dominate the identification process:

1. Being Russian German is something that combines being Russian and being German
2. Being Russian German means being German
3. Being Russian German means being neither Russian nor German


The first concept is by far the most prominent one and only a small minority opts for the second or the third. But the interesting fact is that they exist and can be detected. What is even more interesting is the fact that there is no indication that Russian German means being Russian. This indicates that the boundary between pure Russian and pure German seems to be the most prominent one. This leads to the conclusion that, although collective identities are social constructs, the markers language and culture do play an important role for in-group formation in the case of the Russian Germans. Furthermore, ethnic markers seem to some extent to also play a role as there is no evidence for the, at least theoretically, possible construct that being Russian means being Russian. This is an interesting aspect because following Glick-Schiller et al. members of transnational social networks are mentally deeply rooted in the sending country. Here the (possible) receiving country seems to be more attractive in terms of identification. But if one sees it through history one can argue that due to various constantly changing circumstances and contexts the boundary between Russian Germans and the rest of the Russian society was always there and therefore a mental rootedness in the original sending country seemed to have survived through generations. Viewing the topic from this direction this is already a hint towards the

assumption that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new structures provided new dispositions that provided a starting point from diaspora situation towards an ongoing process of becoming a transnational social field. This now leads to the final question of the migration decision(s).

10. Migration

Whereas the chapter *Migration after the collapse of the Soviet Union* dealt with the large migration flows on a macro level and it was tried to explain how states influence migration flows, this chapter has the approach of examining what happened on the micro level, more precisely, what were the actual reasons that stood behind the migration when people migrated to Germany. People who live in Russia were asked if they wanted to migrate and, if so, what their motives are to migrate.

10.1. Reasons for migration



When asked why they migrated to Germany, most people (77.5 %) agreed that family reasons were either very important or important for the decision to migrate to Germany. Also very important is the factor standard of living in the decision making process (75.0 %) followed by family member who already lived in Germany (72.2 %). Over half of the respondents agreed that better job perspectives (56.2 %) and social security (56.0 %) in Germany were important reasons to migrate to Germany and for nearly a half of the respondents (48.9 %) educational reasons played an important role in the decision


making process. Around forty percent stated economical reasons (42.0%). 37.0 % agreed that it was important or very important for them to live as a German amongst Germans. Political reasons (20.2 %) and historical reasons (18.5 %) (because of the bad experiences of the Russian Germans under the Soviet regime in history), were important for about a fifth in each case. 14.1 % agreed that the love of adventure was an important or very important reason to migrate. The reasons of unemployment, religious reasons and that migration took place because the partner wanted were only important for less than 10 % of the respondents.

What is noticeable at a first glance is that strict economical arguing theories do not provide a fully sufficient explanation of why people migrate. At least that is the case for the Russian Germans. This does not mean that the economic approach does not count at all but for the majority of the respondents other reasons than just economic ones are important also. That family reasons played a very important role in the decision to migrate indicates that in most cases one cannot say that migration is a strictly individual decision but one that is taken at the level of households.

10.2. Motives for migration

The respondents who still reside in Russia were provided with the question whether they wanted to migrate to Germany or not. Over two thirds (69.1 %; N=93) of the people respondent they want to migrate to Germany. The question concerning the reasons why they want migrate shows the following picture.

Chart 10.2: Motives for the desire to migrate to Germany



A first glance at the Chart 10.2 shows that social security (76.6 %) and better life standard (73.5 %) seem to dominate the motives why the respondents want to migrate to Germany. Still very prominent is the reason to live as German under Germans (65.2%), which indicates that there is a strong sense of belonging to Germans as a people within in this subgroup. Economic reasons also rank very high (61.7) when asking for motives for the wish to migrate. That approximately a half state that family members (53.2 %) or friends (50.0 %) live in Germany and this is a very important reason why they want settle there as well is a strong indicator for the approach that social networks play an important role for migration. That almost a half of the respondents see better job-perspectives as important or very important must be seen against the background of the economic crisis that happened worldwide shortly before the survey was started but hit Russia to a greater amount than it did Germany. That 36.6 % responded very important or important are the bad experiences Russian Germans had made under Soviet Regime indicates that although this can be already seen something that lies back in history, people still are at least partly aware of the fact that they were enemies because of their ethnic belonging. Religious reasons do not seem to play an important role for the majority of those who want to migrate to Germany.

10.3. Conclusion or how are the migration reasons interlinked

Factor Analysis

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Economical reasong	,829			
Family reasons		,	,607	
Lust for adventure				,633
Education	,736			
Unemployment	,598			
Better job-perspectives	,841	,		
Family or part of family lives there		,463	,608	
Because partner wanted			,506	,613
Standard of living	,694	,423		
Religious reasons		,668		
Political reasons		,644		
Greater social security	,655	,441		
To live as German under Germans		,723		
Bad experiences of RG in SU		,799		

Rotation Varimax. KMO=0.6

From the factor analysis one can draw the conclusion that economic reasons do indeed play a very strong role in the migration process but they have to be partly separated what one can call seeking after social security as factor 2 indicates. Factor three shows that networks of kinship are also a criterion and factor five indicates that individual reasons always have to be taken into account as well. So, as conclusion one can say that migration cannot be explained sufficiently by either of the theories described above but it seems to be much more an interplay of various circumstances and it is heavily dependent on contexts which approach suits most for the explanation of migration. This leads to the final conclusion that every theory, no matter if micro- or macro-approach, has limitations in explaining but each has a strong potential to explain parts of the forces which stand behind migration. The pro arguments for theories that center on the individual and economic forces behind the decision making process are partly right as economic reasons are stated but social security goes also together with family reasons and living as German under Germans. This is a strong hint that networks do play a role in the decision making process first. Second, the decision does not seem to be an individual one. Third, whereas Brettell argues that networks do not necessarily need ethnic bonds for explaining migration in the case of the Russian Germans ethnicity does to a significant extent. One can conclude with Brettell that households, social and cultural variables must be considered in conjunction with economic variables.⁶¹

11. Summary

As shown in the chapter *Identity*, identity is about ongoing processes of belonging. This has two main sides: What is shared and therefore categorized as markers for belonging and on the other side where the limitations of shared categorizations are. In the case of the Russian Germans this means that there are many actors which are involved into that processes and amongst them the most prominent are:

1. The Russian and the German state

It can be said that both the Russian and the German state, which provide the framework and the structures, had and still have a strong impact on both identity processes of the Russian Germans as well as on social actions deriving from ascriptions and measurements as well as changing inclusion- and exclusion strategies from both sides throughout history until today and ongoing.

⁶¹ Brettell C.B.: *Theorizing Migration in Anthropology*. In: Brettell C.B./ Hollifield J.F. *Migration Theory: Talking about Disciplines*. Routledge; New York: 2008.

2. The society surrounding them, as identity processes also need the other

Here one can see that in Germany in general people tend to perceive Russian Germans as something different. In today's Russia the situation differs as there is currently no sign for this. That does not mean that there is no perceived difference at all, it is more the fact that in Russia other social processes seem to play a much more salient role today.

3. Organizations dealing with Russian Germans on both sides as they can be seen as filters between individual and society

These organizations can be seen as a transnational network trying to conciliate structural changes, facilitating migration and trying to play a major role in the identification process by defining what it means being Russian German. One can also say that the organizations observed operate on a top down level, meaning trying to instrumentalize the Russian Germans.

4. The Russian Germans themselves

Being Russian German is for them, generally speaking, something they are well aware of. Being Russian German is therefore a social category they perceive themselves as part of. The fact that the majority feels itself attached to both the German and the Russian culture but stresses Russian German as identification category as well serves two arguments. There are identity concepts that go beyond nation states that contain a sense of belonging to national cultures as well. This at first seemingly contradictory statement just shows that nation states cannot be seen as pure containers anymore. They are constructs themselves that can provide identification offers but one can be both Russian and German, neither Russian nor German but still Russian German and therefore feel attached to both. So, one can conclude that the concepts of nation states do still play a role in the formation of in-groups. This goes along with the transnational approach which states that people interact in more than one nation state and identify themselves with more than one nation state. This approach states further that it is their activities that lead to the development of transnational fields. This is the link where concepts of belonging interact with concepts of migration.

Migration theories can be divided into theories that center on the individual and one's that see structures as the driving forces behind. Furthermore, older theories stress economic factors as most important for migration.

The pro-arguments for these theories that center on the individual and economic forces behind the decision making process are partly right as economic reasons are stated in the case of the Russian Germans by the respondents themselves. But social security goes also together with family reasons and living as German under Germans. This is a strong hint that networks do play a role in the decision making process first. Second, the decision does not seem to be an individual one. Third, whereas Brettell argues that one does not necessarily need ethnic bonds for explaining networks in the case of the Russian Germans, ethnicity does to a significant extent serve as category and base for a transnational network that is also involved in the decision making process of migration. One can conclude with Brettell that households, social and cultural variables must be considered in conjunction with economic variables.⁶²

⁶² Brettell C.B.: *Theorizing Migration in Anthropology*. In: Brettell C.B./ Hollifield J.F. *Migration Theory: Talking about Disciplines*. Routledge; New York: 2008.

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